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ABSTRACT 
 
Human noroviruses (HuNoVs) are a leading cause of foodborne gastroenteritis worldwide, and are 
easily spread among humans via the faecal-oral route. They can also be spread via environmental 
surfaces and ready-to-eat (RTE) foods that are often prepared by infected food handlers. A low 
infective dose (10–100 virus particles), a high viral load in the vomit and faeces of infected persons 
(up to 109 genomic copies/g), a lack of long-term immunity following previous infection, and a high 
environmental stability of the viruses all enhance the spreading of HuNoV in the population. 
The aim of the research in this thesis is to investigate the prevalence of HuNoVs on environmental 
surfaces and to observe and measure virus transfer from surface to surface during manual food 
preparation. A further aim is to investigate the transfer characteristics and prevalence of HuNoV in 
the environment. A feasible method for the detection of HuNoV on environmental surfaces is 
optimized and used in the laboratory, and also in field studies, both in a resort and in food 
preparation premises. Finally, a measure for controlling the disinfection using ultraviolet light 
irradiation (UV), is tested as a means to inactivate the HuNoVs from environmental surfaces. 
The prevalence and transfer of HuNoV and its surrogate murine norovirus (MuNoV) was investigated 
by swabbing, after which the viruses were eluted from the swabs and their genomes were extracted 
by a commercial kit. HuNoV and MuNoV genomes were detected using reverse transcription 
quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-QPCR) method using specific primers and probes. The 
effects of UV on the viruses were investigated both by viability assays (MuNoV) and by RT-QPCR 
(MuNoV and HuNoV). An enzymatic pre-PCR treatment was conducted before RT-QPCR detection to 
distinguish infective viruses from non-infective viruses. 
Out of the four swab materials tested for swabbing HuNoV on surfaces, the recovery rates of the 
viruses were highest for swabs made of microfiber and polyester, which had been moistened with 
glycine buffer solution, pH 9.5. A semi-direct lysis phase, in which the elution and lysis of the viruses 
happen simultaneously, was found suitable for inclusion in the swabbing protocol. When stored at 
4⁰C, HuNoV persisted well in swabs, whereas at 22⁰C, viruses persisted better on swabs moistened 
by phosphate buffered saline (PBS, pH 7.2) than by glycine buffer. 
HuNoV and MuNoV transferred easily from the hands to the gloves when gloving. In the sandwich 
preparation simulation, HuNoV and MuNoV were repeatedly transferred to the first recipient surface 
(left hand, cucumber, and knife) during the preparation process. It was estimated that when the 
hands of the food handler contain a 3 log10 or more load of infective HuNoV before gloving, a transfer 
of at least one infective virus particle from the contaminated hands to the prepared sandwich was 
likely to occur during the preparation process. Virus-contaminated gloves were estimated to spread 
HuNoV to the food servings more efficiently than a single contaminated cucumber can during 
handling. 
In the field studies, HuNoV was repeatedly detected on environmental surfaces. In a resort, where a 
gastroenteritis outbreak had taken place and HuNoV was the suspected cause, virus ribonucleic acid 
(RNA) was detected on samples taken from several environmental surfaces, including door handles 
both in common and kitchen areas. HuNoV was detected in 10/36 swabs (27.8%), and further 
genotyped as a new HuNoV variant, GII.4 Sydney_2012. In the field study that was conducted in 
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three food-processing companies with no recently reported outbreaks of gastroenteritis, 5/90 swabs 
(5.6%) in 2010 and 7/82 swabs (8.5%) in 2012 were found to be HuNoV GII-positive. The three 
positives were detected in a production line and nine positives were obtained from the food 
handlers’ break room and restroom areas. Of the 168 swab samples collected during the one-year 
HuNoV prevalence study conducted at the same ready-to-eat food manufacturing companies, four 
(2.4%) were HuNoV GII positive. Positive swabs were collected from fridge door handles and coffee 
machines in the break rooms of the food industry employees. 
UV was observed as a potential inactivation method for HuNoV: a loss of infectivity and a 4 log10 
reduction of HuNoV surrogate MuNoV were observed when the virus-containing surfaces were 
exposed to UV dose of 60 mJ/cm2 or higher. In the RT-QPCR assay, a distinct difference in RNA levels 
of HuNoV and MuNoV were not observed until UV doses of 300–1800 mJ/cm2, when the RNA levels 
of untreated samples remained at a level of 2–2.3 log10 polymerase chain reaction units (pcr-u) while 
the RNA levels of enzyme-treated samples declined to less than 1 log10 pcr-u. Methods based on 
genome detection seemed to overestimate HuNoV persistence even when samples were pre-treated 
before the genome detection was conducted. 
In order to get more detailed picture of the epidemiology and transmission routes of HuNoVs, 
sensitive and feasible methods for their detection, such as the one presented in this thesis, are 
essential. As seen in the studies included in the thesis, HuNoV is transmitted very easily from human 
hands to food and environmental surfaces. Proper hand hygiene combined with effective measures 
to inactivate HuNoV from surfaces, such as UV, is needed to manage the transmission of this very 
persistent enteric virus. Due to the rapid onset of HuNoV outbreaks, the origin of the virus is often 
hard to define, but it would be necessary to be able to target the control measures efficiently. 
Therefore, adequate and regular monitoring of the environment for virus contamination in potential 
fountainheads of gastroenteritis outbreaks, such as in hospitals and restaurants serving RTE foods, 
could prevent or restrict HuNoV outbreaks. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Human noroviruses (HuNoVs) are the most common cause of non-bacterial gastroenteritis 
outbreaks, and sporadic infectious intestinal disease in the community (1-3). The virus was first found 
in 1972 in a faecal sample by using immunoelectron microscopy (4). It remained little studied until 
1990, when its genome was cloned and characterized (5). Nowadays, noroviruses are cathegorized as 
belonging to the Caliciviridae family, and are further classified into five genogroups, three of which 
(GI, GII, and GIV) are found in humans (6). The genogroups are further subdivided into genetic 
clusters called genotypes, of which GII.4 is currently the most common genotype that causes 
infections in humans (7). 
HuNoVs are transmitted from person to person either directly or indirectly via water, food, or 
contaminated surfaces (7, 8). The route of infection is the ingestion of HuNoV contaminated faeces 
or vomit. HuNoVs are shed in large numbers, up to 109 genomic copies/g, in the faeces of infected 
individuals (9), whereas the infective dose is believed to be as low as 10–100 virus particles (10). The 
virus can be shed in the faeces of a normal infected person for over a month and for several months 
in the faeces of a person whose immune status has been compromised (11, 12). Symptomatic HuNoV 
infections, present most commonly with vomiting and diarrhoea, are usually relatively mild and self-
limiting in otherwise healthy adults. Nevertheless, they may be more severe among young children, 
the elderly and the immunocompromised persons (12, 13), causing human suffering and also 
economical losses due to hospitalization and absentees from work. 
The role of food handlers in the transmission of HuNoV is well documented (14-16). It is not 
surprising that the most common food items that cause foodborne outbreaks are those that are 
prepared by hand and eaten without further cooking, such as sandwiches and salads (14). Modern 
lifestyle has lead to an increase in the consumption of these food products and thus their significance 
as virus vehicles. HuNoVs have been shown to transfer easily between foods, food preparation 
surfaces, hands, and the environment in laboratory studies (17), but more information on the 
transfer of HuNoVs in actual food preparing situations is needed in order to prevent the facilitation 
of viral transfer caused by infected food handlers in HuNoV outbreaks. 
In addition to being highly contagious, HuNoV is very resistant towards environmental hazards (18, 
19). HuNoV is extremely difficult to culture in cell lines, thus most of the persistence studies have 
been performed using surrogate viruses, or the reduction of the virus has been measured by changes 
in ribonucleic acid (RNA) levels (17). Results obtained in those studies indicate that HuNoV persists 
on different surfaces for days at room temperature (RT) (17) and for hours on human hands (20). 
HuNoV seems to tolerate well relatively high or low temperatures, variable pH levels, and several 
disinfectants. Promising methods to inactivate HuNoV, such as ultraviolet light irradiation (UV), still 
need more investigation before they can be recommended for disinfection of the environment, 
including environmental surfaces (21). 
This doctoral thesis was conducted to supplement the existing knowledge on the methods used for 
detecting HuNoV on surfaces, the incidence of HuNoV on and transfer between environmental and 
food surfaces, in addition to the means to inactivate HuNoVs from these surfaces. A treatment that 
would ensure that the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is only copying genomes of infectious viruses 
in the sample was also validated in this research.  
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2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 The history of HuNoVs 
HuNoV is the causative agent for gastroenteritis disease of non-bacterial origin and it remained 
unknown in spite of intensive volunteer studies until 1972. In 1972, Kapikian and his co-workers 
isolated and identified it from a faecal sample by immune electron microscopy with covalescent sera 
in patients of the same outbreak (4). The virus was named Norwalk agent, or later Norwalk virus, 
after the location in which the virus had caused an outbreak of gastroenteritis among children at an 
Elementary School in 1968. At that time, HuNoVs were only detected by using specialized equipment 
and methods, such as immune electron microscopy. HuNoVs were described as being small, round, 
structured viruses according to what was seen under the microscope (Fig 1).  
It was not until 1990, that the genome of Norwalk virus was cloned and characterized (5). Sequencing 
of the genome showed that these viruses have a genomic organization consistent with viruses 
belonging to the order Picornavirales, and the family Caliciviridae. The characterization of Norwalk 
virus, later shortened to norovirus, led to more intensive studying and better an understanding of 
the molecular virology, epidemiology and worldwide incidence of these viruses. 
 
Fig 1. Transmission electron micrograph of HuNoV (photo was taken by Anssi Mörttinen, Department 
of Virology, University of Helsinki). Caliciviruses, including HuNoV, have obtained their name from the 
Latin word for chalice, calix, according to the cup-shaped structures on the surface of intact capsids. 
2.2 Structure and genome of HuNoVs 
HuNoV virions are non-enveloped and small: they consist of a capsid and a nucleic acid that measure 
about 27 to 30 nm in diameter (6, 22-25). The nucleocapsid, as seen by using an electron microscopy, 
is rounded and exhibits an icosahedral symmetry. The capsid is mainly constructed of a single 
protein, which is organized into 180 similar protein units according to icosahedral T-3-symmetry.  
The virus genome consists of a linear molecule of single-strand RNA, as seen in Fig 2 (5). It has a 
positive polarity and it can serve as messenger RNA and infect target cells directly. Its complete 
genome contains approximately 7.5 kb and consists of 45%–56% of cytosine + guanine (C + G). The 
genome 3’ end has a poly A tail, which is characteristic of the messenger RNA of eukaryotic cells, 
whereas the 5‘ end  presents the VPg protein, needed in virus infectivity and initial translation. The 
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genome includes three open reading frames: the first ORF encodes a 194-kDa polyprotein, the 
second a structural 60-kDa capsid protein (VP1), and the third the 23-kDa basic protein (VP2), which 
interacts with the genome RNA when the virion formation occurs (6, 22-25). VP1 protein is believed 
to participate in the identification of the target cells receptors. It consists of a capsid which has P1, P2 
and S domains. Amino acid changes in the P2 domain, which contains antigen-presenting sites and 
carbohydrate-receptor binding regions, may facilitate infection of target cells (26). 
 
Fig 2. HuNoV genome structure from 5’ end to 3’ end (27). N-term: amino-terminus, NTPase: 
nucleotide triphosphatase, VPg: viral protein genome-linked, 3A-like: region of the nonstructural 
polyprotein, Pro: protease, Pol: polymerase, VP1: capsid protein, VP2: basic protein, A(n): poly A tail 
2.3 Classification and taxonomy of noroviruses 
The Caliciviridae family, in addition to Genus Norovirus, include the following genera: Lagoviruses, 
Neboviruses, Sapoviruses, and Vesiviruses. Additional genera have been proposed to be included in 
the family: Recovirus, Valovirus and a number of other unclassified caliciviruses including the chicken 
calicivirus (28). At the moment, the classification of noroviruses is based on ORF2 phylogenetic 
analyses of 164 norovirus sequences into five genogroups, from GI to GV (2, 22-24). Three of the 
genogroups, GI, GII, and GIV, are found in humans. The genogroups are reported to subdivide further 
into genetic clusters called genotypes and numerous subgroups (29, 30). In 2014, GI was known to 
have consisted of nine, GII of 22 and GIV of at least two genotypes. The prototype strain, Norwalk 
virus, has been classified as a GI.1. 
Recent studies indicate that there are differencies in the evolution potential between the HuNoV 
genogroups (31). It seems that some HuNoVs belonging to the II genogroup, especially GII.4, are 
more prone to evolve than some HuNoVs belonging to GI, which may have only limited potential for 
evolution. The differences between HuNoV strains may be one of the major reasons why during 
recent decades, HuNoV GII.4 has been the most common genotype to have caused viral 
gastrointestinal infections in humans worldwide (7). New epidemic variants of GII.4 have emerged 
every two to three years during this time. Rapid evolution, population immunity, and antigenic 
variation of the genotype have led to emergence of these new virus variants, associated with several 
global epidemics (32). Lindesmith and co-workers suggested in 2008 that the carbohydrate ligand 
binding domain in the HuNoV GII.4 capsid is subject to heavy immune selection and probably evolves 
by antigenic drift (33). This evolution of the HuNoV GII surface structures would facilitate escape 
from the protective herd immunity and facilitate virus persistence in the community. These evolved 
GII.4 variants have been commonly named. The pandemic variants of GII.4 include US 1995/96, 
Farmington Hills_2002, Hunter_2004, Yerseke_2006a, Den Haag_2006b, New Orleans_2009, and 
most recently, Sydney_2012. Other GII.4 variants that have not exhibited pandemic characteristics 
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have been described, including Henry_2001, Japan_2001, Asia_2003, Osaka_2007, and 
Apeldoorn_2008 (32).  
2.3.1 HuNoV GII.4 Sydney variant 
In 2012, several countries, including the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, and Japan, 
announced an increase in HuNoV outbreaks (34). The first molecular data, reported in Australia in 
March 2012, indicated that the increase was associated with the emergence of a new variant of GII.4, 
named Sydney_2012. This variant has been shown to have a common ancestor with two previously 
dominant GII.4 variants, Apeldoorn_2007 and New Orleans_2009. In the winter of 2012/2013 
November-March, the Sydney_2012 was the most frequently detected variant during HuNoV 
outbreaks all over the world, except in the Netherlands (35). The peak of these outbreaks was 
reached approximately two months earlier, in November 2012, compared to previous HuNoV 
seasons. 
2.4 HuNoV surrogates 
Since the first detection of HuNoV, several attempts have been made to cultivate it in the laboratory 
(36, 37). Duizer and co-workers tested several cell lines, able to support growth of other enteric 
viruses, to cultivate HuNoVs (37). Although HuNoVs could be detected in some of the cell lines for 
several passages, no cytopathic effect caused by the viruses could be detected in these cells. Later, 
adult human duodenal tissues were infected successfully by HuNoVs but when foetal ileum tissue 
was infected, only limited virus replication was detected (38). Most recently, HuNoVs were cultivated 
in a three dimensional cell culture model consisting of Int-407 and Caco-2 cells (39). Despite 
detecting changes in the cells, no significant increase in the viral titer of HuNoV was observed. 
Since HuNoVs cannot feasibly be cultured in vitro, most studies on the persistence and inactivation of 
HuNoVs cannot directly examine virus survival under different conditions, except in volunteer 
studies. Indirect data on the infectivity of these viruses can be collected by measuring the decreasing 
levels of viral RNA during challenge studies, or by using surrogate viruses instead of HuNoVs in 
infectivity studies. Surrogate viruses are viruses that are related to the pathogens they have been 
chosen to represent. The selection of a surrogate for HuNoV has been based on the ability of the 
surrogate to be propagated in culture, and its genetic, physical, or chemical relatedness to the 
HuNoV pathogen.  
Bacteriophage MS2 (MS2), Feline calicivirus (FCV), Murine norovirus (MuNoV) and more recently 
Tulane virus have been used as surrogates for HuNoV (40). MS2 has been used to indicate faecal 
contamination, and possibly HuNoV contamination, in the environment. The advantage of MS2 is 
that it can be cultured in Echerichia coli cells. Its suitability to be used as a surrogate is, however, 
questionable due to its distant relatedness to HuNoVs (41). FCV is a respiratory virus that belongs to 
the genus Vesivirus. It can be easily cultured in feline kidney cells (CrFK) and it has been widely used 
as a surrogate for HuNoV (42). MuNoV-1, norovirus of genogroup V and the first norovirus to be  
grown in a cell culture, is more closely related to HuNoVs than FCV (43). The virus has been shown to 
replicate in both macrophages and dendritic cells in vitro (44), of which the RAW 264.7 cell line is the 
most commonly used. It is transmitted from mouse to mouse via the faecal-oral route, but it does 
not cause gastroenteritis symptoms in healthy mice but rather a wasting syndrome in immune 
deficient individuals. Tulane virus was recently discovered in a rhesus monkey and it represents a 
 15 
 
new genus in the family of Caliciviridae, Recovirus (45). Although readily cultivable in vitro, it has not 
been shown to cause gastroenteritis in monkeys like the HuNoVs in humans. 
2.5 HuNoV infection 
HuNoVs infect people of all ages (46). The disease occurs all year round, but the outbreaks caused by 
HuNoV tend to peak in cold weather, which in the Northern hemisphere is from November to March 
(22). Therefore, HuNoV disease has been historically called ‘winter vomiting disease’ and the name is 
still widely used. Clinical HuNoV infection has an incubation period of between 10 to 51 h, typically 
24–48 h (46). HuNoV gastroenteritis patients often present with nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, 
and watery diarrhoea. Other symptoms include anorexia, malaise, fever, and occasionaly, bloody 
diarrhoea. Recently, GII.4 HuNoVs have been observed to result in more severe symptoms of 
gastroenteritis and a higher frequency of painful symptoms compared to infection caused by other 
HuNoVs (11, 47). The disease can lead to hospitalization due to dehydration especially when the 
patients are very young, very old, or immunocompromised. A correlation between HuNoV 
gastroenteritis outbreaks and deaths in the elderly population has been observed (13, 48). 
Asymptomatic infections are also common: they have been estimated to occur in approximately one 
third of infected persons (49). Clinical symptoms usually pass within two to three days, although 
immunocompromised persons can suffer from them for several more days.  
Transmission of HuNoVs occurs from person to person mainly through the faecal-oral route: a person 
ingests infective virus particles, which were previously shed in the faeces by infected persons (22). 
Virus shedding can also occur during vomiting and lead to the transmission of the pathogen through 
air droplets (50). Transmission of HuNoVs also occurs either directly or indirectly via contaminated 
water, food, or environmental surfaces. The low infective dose of HuNoVs is approximately 10 to 100 
virus particles and this, facilitates the transmission of the virus (10). HuNoVs are shed in large 
numbers, up to 109 genomic copies per g, in faeces of infected individuals, especially one to three 
days after the onset of the illness (9, 51, 52). These numbers suggest that each gram of faeces during 
peak shedding from an infected person might contain approximately 5 billion infectious doses of 
HuNoV (21). Shedding can continue for up to eight weeks in previously healthy persons and for more 
than several months in patients who are immunocompromised (9). Even longer shedding time has 
been observed for the prototype strain, Norwalk virus GI.1 (11). Phillips and co-workers (2010) 
reported that the highest risk for getting HuNoV infection occurs upon contact with a person with 
HuNoV gastroenteritis symptoms (53). It is common that small children in a family fall ill first and 
then transmit the disease to other family members. 
Immunity in volunteers after HuNoV infection has been studied to investigate the development and 
duration of immunity. These studies have suggested that patients develop a short-term immunity 
after infection, but that infections can occur by encountering with other strains or with the same 
strain sometime later in life (54). IgG antibodies against HuNoV GII.4 are commonly found in children 
(31). In Finland the antibody prevalence was measured at 91.2% in children older than 5 years (55). 
Genetic susceptibility to HuNoV infections is related to the expression of histo-blood group antigen 
carbohydrates on the mucosal surface of the intestinal epithelial cells (23). Host genetic susceptibility 
and histo-blood group binding patterns appear to be HuNoV strain-specific. For instance, individuals 
who carry a gene encoding a functional alpha-1,2-fucosyltransferase (secretors), needed to express 
histo-blood group antigens, are more susceptible than average to get the HuNoV GI.1 infection (33). 
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Individuals with defects in the alpha-1,2-fucosyltransferase gene (non-secretors) do not express the 
appropriate histo-blood antigens and are thus resistant to the HuNoV GI.1 infection. 
2.5.1 HuNoV vaccine 
Studies of the epidemiology of HuNoVs increasingly show that the incidence and severity of the 
disease caused by these viruses is such, that immunization against the agent would be highly 
beneficial (56). Unfortunately, since HuNoVs are very species-specific, there are no robust small 
animal models of human infection and disease, which makes the development of a vaccine difficult. 
The development of HuNoV like particles (VLPs), which are morphologically and antigenically similar 
to native HuNoVs but empty of RNA, has offered a promising route toward effective vaccine 
candidates designed to protect against multiple circulating HuNoV strains (57, 58). Vaccine 
development is mostly concentrated to be efficient against HuNoV GII.4 and GI.1 strains, but 
discussion has been going on whether they should protect also against other HuNoV strains, such as 
GII.3 (31). 
In Finland, an injectable rotavirus-HuNoV combination vaccine was developed to prevent infection or 
gastroenteritis induced by these viruses (59). The vaccine has been shown to produce antibody 
responses that exceed six months towards HuNoV GII.4 in mice (60). Recently, in the Unites States, 
an intramuscular bivalent HuNoV vaccine, which was designed to protect against GI.1 and GII.4 
strains of HuNoV, provide a protection against the symptoms of HuNoV infection in a small volunteer 
study (61). Both of these rotavirus-HuNoV and HuNoV GI.1/GII.4 vaccines were planned to be studied 
in clinical trials in 2014. 
2.6 HuNoV epidemiology and outbreaks 
HuNoV has been estimated to cause approximately 21 million cases of acute gastroenteritis each 
year in the United States alone (1). The incidence of HuNoV-associated gastroenteritis has been 
calculated to be 4.5 cases per 100 person-years in England (3). It has also been assumed to be similar 
in other countries, although it has not been intensively studied (1). Due to the often mild course of 
the disease people rarely seek medical aid for treating the disease and thus, only a fraction of HuNoV 
cases are reported to the official registers around the world. Outbreaks of HuNoV gastroenteritis are 
reported more extensively, although the reports are sometimes not commonly available. The 
investigation of HuNoV outbreaks is also difficult, as secondary infections among the population are 
common. It has been estimated that HuNoV is responsible for approximately 50% (range: 36%–59%) 
of all reported gastroenteritis outbreaks in the United States and in Europe (2). Periodic increases in 
HuNoV outbreaks tend to occur in association with the emergence of new GII.4 strains that evade 
population immunity (32). The economic impact of HuNoV infections, including the costs of hospital 
visits, is likely to be substantial, amounting to billions of euros (1, 62). 
The program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED-mail) is a worldwide outbreak reporting 
system, which has been used to report HuNoV outbreaks with extensive coverage (63). In the United 
States, outbreaks are also reported to a national surveillance system called ‘CaliciNet’. From the 
inception of CaliciNet in March 2009 through to May 2010, 552 outbreaks had been uploaded to this 
national database (64). In Europe, ‘Food-Borne Viruses in Europe Network’ has collected reports of 7 
636 HuNoV outbreaks and sporadic cases in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, England and Wales, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, and Spain in 2001–2006 (65). 
During this time, HuNoV activity was the most pronounced in the epidemic seasons 2002–2003 and 
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2004–2005. The main HuNoV strain responsible for the outbreaks during these two seasons was a 
new variant of GII.4 (66). At the same time, GI strains of HuNoV were mostly associated with 
foodborne outbreaks, especially those that had originated from bivalve molluscs (67). 
In Finland, a PCR method for the detection of HuNoVs was developed in the Department of Virology, 
University of Helsinki at the end of 90’s, which boosted the diagnostics of outbreak investigations of 
HuNoV (68). The recently mounted method allowed further characterisation HuNoV strains, as well 
as more accurate study of the epidemiological issues that are related to the HuNoV outbreaks (69). 
Cases of HuNoV infection have been registered by the National Institute for Health and Welfare since 
1998 (70). The number of reported cases have increased considerably in the most recent decade, 
being at the moment around 1 500 to 3 000 cases per year (Fig 3). 
 
 
Fig 3. Registered cases of HuNoV infection in Finland from 1998 to 2013. 
Outbreaks of HuNoV gastroenteritis commonly occur in closed settings, such as hospitals, hotels, 
cruise ships, and day-care centres (71). According to data collected by Matthews and his co-workers 
(2012), which consisted of 902 HuNoV outbreak descriptions reported in articles published from 
1993 to 2011, the majority of the outbreaks occurred in healthcare facilities and foodservice settings 
(7). In over 50% of the outbreaks the transmission route was reported to be associated with food. In 
less than one third of the outbreaks, HuNoV was directly transmitted from person to person, while in 
only 60 of the 902 outbreaks HuNoV was transmitted via the environment. Foodborne outbreaks 
have greater attack rates compared to person-to-person and environmental outbreaks. This may be 
partly due to ingestion of higher infectious doses of HuNoV. An overview of the HuNoV transmission 
routes, which often lead to outbreaks of gastroenteritis, is shown in Fig 4. 
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Fig 4. Overview of the proven and hypothetical transmission routes of HuNoVs, as presented by 
Mathijs and colleaques (16). The thickest arrows present the most common transmission routes for 
HuNoV, while the thin arrows indicate less frequent transmission routes. Dashed lines represent 
hypothetical transmission routes for HuNoV. NoV=HuNoV 
HuNoVs are rarely detected in samples obtained from food items in food-borne gastroenteritis 
outbreak investigations for several reasons. First, food items may simply not be available for analysis. 
Second, the levels of HuNoVs in food may be low, especially when the food has become 
contaminated by a food handler infected with the virus (16). Third, the portion of foods analysed 
may not have contained HuNoVs due to uneven distribution of these viruses in the foods that were 
sampled. Fourth, foods may contain such substances that inhibit the detection of HuNoVs. In the 
absence of methods for HuNoV detection in food samples, four epidemiological features have been 
used to classify outbreaks, for which HuNoV is the suspected cause (72). These Kaplan criteria include 
vomiting which is a reported symptom in over half of the ill persons, the incubation period of the 
disease ranges between 24–48 hours, the symptoms pass within 12 to 60 hours, and no bacterial 
pathogens are present in the faecal samples of the ill patients. 
2.6.1 Outbreaks caused by RTE food products 
Ready-to-eat (RTE) food is food that is ordinarily consumed in the same state as that in which it was 
sold or distributed. RTE food meant to be consumed without heating or other further handling. 
Typically, it consists of different food components, such as vegetables and meat products. The most 
common food items that cause HuNoV outbreaks are bivalve molluscs including oysters, soft fruit 
including raspberry, and leafy greens (16, 30). RTE food products can be contaminated with HuNoV 
by contact with faecal material or vomit, which can occur during any stage of the food production. At 
a pre-harvest level, contamination usually happens by irrigation or washing the fresh produce with 
virus contaminated water or by use of contaminated manure or contaminated pesticides (16, 73). At 
post-harvest level, contamination can occur by manual harvesting, processing, or preparation of 
foods. The manual picking of food ingredients, such as berries, is sometimes also regarded as pre-
harvest level contamination. In most outbreaks involving RTE foods, the route of contamination is 
hard to define. In the following outbreak cases, presented in Table 1, the source contamination was, 
however, identified. 
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2.6.2 Outbreaks caused by an infected food handler 
Food handlers have been confirmed to play a major role in HuNoV transmission which led to food-
borne outbreaks (16). Data collected by Todd and his co-workers (80), indicate direct, bare hand 
contact between the food handler hands and food was the most common factor associated with 
outbreaks involving a food handler. Often food handlers have been asymptomatic virus shedders, or 
they have returned to work after the gastroenteritis symptoms had passed but the shedding of virus 
was still continuing (81), as shown by the faecal samples taken during an outbreak investigation. In 
some outbreaks, however, the food handler had come to work still suffering from the gastroenteritis 
symptoms. In one of the most extreme cases, a food handler had vomited inside the kitchen area due 
to the sudden onset of the disease thereby spreading the infective HuNoV particles to the 
surroundings and food (81). Most common food items associated with HuNoV outbreaks where the 
food handler was involved have been RTE foods, especially delicatessen sandwiches, hereafter 
referred to in this text as deli sandwiches, as seen in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Examples of HuNoV outbreaks in 2003–2010, for which contamination of food happened at 
pre-harvest. 
Food 
involved 
Attack 
rate 
Confirmed HuNoV Place/event of the 
outbreak 
Country Reference 
Patient 
stool 
Food  
Oysters 14 cases 2/4 
GI.1 
5/6 
GI.1 
Bought from two 
stores, eaten home 
France (74) 
Mussels 103/139 
 
24/24  
GI and GII 
6/11 
GI and 
GII 
Easter/restaurants 
and picnics 
Italy (75) 
Oysters 305 
cases 
4/5 GII 6/11 GII Hotels, clubs and 
restaurants 
Singapore (76) 
Oysters 202 
cases 
29/53 
GI.4/6, 
GII.4/8/b 
3/3  
GI.4, 
GII.4, 
GII.8 
International 
outbreak 
Italy, France (77) 
Raspberries* ~200 
cases 
2/2  
GI.4 
3/5  
GI.4 
Catering setting, 
daycare center 
Finland (78) 
Lettuce 260/480 2/25 GI 
12/25 GII 
1/2 GII Sandwich lunch Denmark (79) 
Modified from (16) 
*either pre-harvest or post-harvest contamination 
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2.6.3 Outbreaks caused by the environmental transmission of HuNoV 
Environmental transmission of HuNoV is a less important mode of spread than direct human-to-
human transmission or food or food handler transmission in HuNoV outbreaks as a whole. 
Nevertheless, environmental transmission has played a major role in a number of outbreaks (1). The 
outbreaks where groups in a common setting, but who have had no known direct contact and have 
been sequentially affected, are the most easily identified to involve environmental HuNoV 
transmission. In the two following examples of outbreaks, environmental transmission was 
confirmed. 
In the autumn of 2009, an airline medical team was informed that several flight attendants who had 
worked in different crews had fallen ill with gastroenteritis over a time period of six days (93). All 
Table 2. Examples of HuNoV outbreaks in 2001–2012, in which food handler involvement has been 
confirmed. 
Food 
involved 
Attack 
rate 
Confirmed HuNoV Place/event 
of the 
outbreak 
Country Reference 
Non-food 
handlers 
Food 
handlers 
Deli 
sandwich  
140/231 15/16  - (ill 5/8) Buffet lunch 
in a dance 
theatre 
The 
Netherlands 
(82) 
 
Deli 
sandwich  
38/57 12/14  2/4  Hotel Spain (83) 
 
Wedding 
cake 
332/2700 
 
2/2 2/2 46 weddings The United 
States of 
America 
(84) 
 
Deli 
sandwich 
34/427 12/14 GI.3 1/1 GI.3 Hospital 
cafeteria 
Spain (85) 
 
Deli 
sandwiches 
87/142 21/21 1/1 Luncheon in 
a restaurant 
The United 
States 
(86) 
 
Deli 
sandwich 
231/505 24/27 GII 1/1 GII Buffet lunch The 
Netherlands 
(81) 
 
Salad 
vegetables 
182/325 5/6 GII.7 4/5 GII.7 Telephone 
company  
canteen 
Austria (87) 
Salad 
vegetables in 
pastry 
more than 
23 persons 
22/23 
GII.4 
3/3 GII.4  School lunch Japan (88) 
Salad  
vegetables 
60/106 6/13 GII.6 1/1 GII.6 Barbeque England (89) 
 
Ham rolls 21/63 3/21 GII 1/1 GII Pre-
Christmas 
celebration 
Austria (90) 
 
Chips, spare 
ribs 
and bread 
14/31 13/13 GI 4/6 Restaurant The 
Netherlands 
(91) 
Mushroom 
dish,wedding 
cake 
26/103 2/26 GII 6/14 GII.4 Wedding Austria (92) 
Modified from (16) 
 
 21 
 
these crews had worked on the same aeroplane over successive flight sectors over the six day period. 
The outbreak had started, when one of the passengers on a flight had vomited and soiled the carpet 
next to his seat. A total of 27 out of 77 flight attendants who had worked on that aeroplane 
developed gastroenteritis symptoms. HuNoV GI.6 was identified in two stool samples that were 
collected for analysis from the flight attendants. 
In the winter of 1999, the Environment and Public Protection Division in Wales was notified of 
outbreaks of gastroenteritis at two primary schools, which affected 163 out of 315 (57.7%) children 
(94). The children had attended the same lunchtime concert at a large concert hall. The 
environmental surfaces of the concert hall had been contaminated by HuNoV-containing vomit the 
day before the children attended. Concert hall staff had cleaned up the vomit and the carpeted areas 
of the concert hall but no hypochlorite-based product was used. After the lunchtime concert, 
gastroenteritis was also reported by 37 other attendees of the same concert. Ten of them attended 
an event on the same day as the index case, nine attended on the same venue three days after the 
index case, and 12 on the day after that. Six persons fallen ill attended to the venue that took place 
five days after the initial vomiting episode. 
2.6.4 Outbreaks in Finland 
In Finland, HuNoV has been the most common cause of food-borne gastroenteritis outbreaks in 
recent years (95). The virus caused 31% of the food-borne outbreaks in Finland in 2010, two of the 
outbreaks being the largest gastroenteritis outbreaks in that year. In these outbreaks HuNoV was 
only rarely detected directly from food items. Therefore most of the outbreaks have been classified 
as caused by HuNoV based on epidemiological investigation, which was supported by data showing 
the same HuNoV genotype in the faecal samples of the victims and the food handlers. More recently, 
swabs from food handling areas which tested positive for HuNoV have sometimes strengthened the 
evidence for classification of the outbreaks. 
In a five-year study (1998–2002) in Finland, HuNoV was shown to have caused 60.6% of the 
investigated 416 viral gastroenteritis outbreaks during the study period (69). Most of the outbreaks 
were caused by HuNoV GII, whereas GI was detected in only 35 of the 416 (8%) outbreaks. The 
outbreaks had most often occurred in hospitals (30.6%) followed by restaurants and canteens 
(14.3%). In one of the outbreaks, which occurred between December 1999 and January 2000, a 
prolonged HuNoV outbreak took place in a rehabilitation centre (96). An environmental 
contamination of HuNoV was confirmed, for the virus was found in swab samples taken from rooms 
of people that had fallen ill and also from common areas, including the handle of an ultrasound 
physiotherapy instrument. Six years later, in the winter of 2006–2007, HuNoV variant GII.4.-2006b 
caused an outbreak in a large tertiary care hospital (97). The outbreak affected both the staff of the 
hospital (205 infected) and the patients (240 infected), contributed to nine deaths among the 
patients. 
In 2009, the virology laboratory in the Department of Food and Environmental Hygiene in the 
University of Helsinki received an increasing amount of frozen raspberry samples, related to 
gastroenteritis outbreaks with HuNoV as the suspected cause (78).  In total 21 notifications of these 
HuNoV outbreaks, which affected about 200 people, were sent to the National Institute for Health 
and Welfare (98). HuNoV GI.4 was detected both in samples from people who had fallen ill in the 
outbreaks and from raspberries that were suspected as the source of the outbreak. A pre-harvest 
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contamination by the raspberries was suspected, because the berries had been imported from 
Poland and distributed by a single wholesaler, and they were the only common factor in the 
described outbreaks (78). Although heating of raspberries of foreign origin before consuming had 
been recommended by the Finnish Food Agency, currently Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira since 
2000, the berries had been used in desserts and cakes without heating. 
During the spring of 2012 in Southern Finland, environmental swabs were used in an epidemiological 
investigation of restaurants and school canteens where a gastroenteritis outbreak was suspected 
(99). In half of the outbreaks, swabs were positive for HuNoV contamination on the environmental 
surfaces of the food handling premises or the toilet areas that were dedicated for food handlers. The 
faecal samples of the people who had fallen ill also revealed HuNoV. These outbreaks could be 
classified as foodborne HuNoV outbreaks, even though food items were not available for analysis.  
2.7 Detection methods for HuNoVs on surfaces 
It has been known for several decades that HuNoVs cause large outbreaks of gastroenteritis. The 
development of molecular techniques for the detection of HuNoVs that was based on the sequence 
of the virus published in 1990 enabled direct diagnostics of HuNoV since it enabled a very specific 
identification (5). Prior to this innovation, HuNoV had been only detected in human clinical samples: 
by (immune) transmission electron microscopy in faecal samples or by methods that detect a specific 
antigen in serum samples. Nowadays it is possible to use the sequence-based detection methods of 
HuNoV, which are more sensitive methods compared to electron microscopy. They are used in food, 
water and environmental samples, and they facilitate outbreak investigations and research on virus 
transmission and transfer routes. 
Samples obtained from environmental surfaces can be used for the evaluations of hygiene standards 
in food processing environments and in semi-closed communities, such as in day-care centres, 
elderly homes and hospitals. In these communities, the residents often use the same areas for eating 
and the same restrooms, and the immune status of the residents is often low. Swabs can be used to 
monitor the incidence of harmful viruses to circumvent large outbreaks (100). 
Environmental samples can also be used as a tool for outbreak investigations for foodborne 
outbreaks and also for monitoring the direct spread of HuNoV from human to human (101). 
Environmental samples do not give direct information on the extent of contamination in the foods or 
the people. Environmental samples do show that the pathogen is present, which helps the 
investigators to narrow down the list of possible causes. This is especially the case in outbreaks 
where human stool samples or food items related to the outbreak could not be collected or the 
bacterial analyses of food items did not indicate a cause for the outbreak. 
HuNoVs hitherto have not been grown in cell culture. Therefore, the current methods for detection 
of HuNoV focus on detecting viral RNA or HuNoV antigen (8). Nowadays, the detection of viral RNA is 
often used when detecting HuNoV in water, food, and environmental samples. The levels of the virus 
are usually very low in these specimens, which leads to the need of concentrating and/or extracting 
the virus from the sample material. Validated methods for these techniques are now available for 
bottled water, bivalve mollusc shellfish, soft fruit and leafy vegetables, and food surfaces (102). 
According to the ISO standard, the recommended method for HuNoV sampling for food surfaces is 
done by swabbing with a moistened swab, followed by RNA extraction and reverse transcription 
quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-QPCR). 
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2.7.1 Swab sampling 
Swab sampling or swabbing describes a protocol, whereby environmental or food surfaces are wiped 
by a swabbing tool, such as a cotton wool stick or cotton cloth, the viruses are subsequently 
detached from the tool, and the virus or its genome is detected by a variety of different methods 
(103). In the case of HuNoVs, the detection method is almost always either RT-PCR or RT-QPCR.  
The effectiveness of a swabbing method is often measured by calculating the percentage of viruses 
that were recovered from a certain surface to the known amount of viruses that were applied to the 
surface before swabbing. This fraction of viruses is called the viral yield or viral recovery rate. 
Previous studies implicate that the swab material, the surface material, and the solution used to 
remove the viruses from the surface and later, from the swab, have an impact on the recovery rates 
of viruses. In a review conducted in 2011 by Julian and co-workers, a polyester swab moistened in 
saline solution was to give the highest recovery rates of the phage MS2, which ranged from 45% to 
over 100% (103). In a study by Scherer and co-workers, the recovery rates when swabbing surfaces 
with a cotton wool stick moistened by phosphate buffered saline (PBS) solution were from 10% to 
58%, which found the highest rates for ceramic surfaces and the lowest for wood surfaces (104). 
Gibson and co-workers tested the removal of HuNoV surrogates MuNoV and FCV from solid surfaces 
by wiping the surfaces with microfiber cloths, and reported a removal of 3.5 log10-units (PFU) of both 
viruses from these surfaces (105). 
2.7.2 Other methods for surface sampling 
In addition to swabbing, HuNoVs can be collected from surfaces by back and forth pipetting, as 
described by D’Souza and co-workers (2006) (106). The viruses do not need to be detached, or 
eluted, from the swabbing material when using this method. Scraping the sampled surfaces with a 
cell scraper while pipetting, was suggested to aid in sampling and indeed it has been reported to 
enhance the virus recovery from surfaces (107). In the third method for surface sampling, disks of 
surface materials are placed on a petri dish or plate and covered with an elution solution (103). It is 
feasible for only very small disks of surface materials and it has therefore been used mainly in 
experimental studies in the laboratory. Viruses are then eluted from these surfaces by shaking the 
petri dish to generate a flushing effect. In 2013, Stals and co-workers reported viral recoveries for 
HuNoV that ranged from 5%  for lettuce to 40%  for nitrile glove using this method (108). 
2.7.3 Elution and RNA extraction 
When surface samples are taken by a swab, the next step in the preparation for analysis is virus 
elution. For HuNoV samples, which are usually analysed by PCR assays, the most common elution 
agent has been saline solution, such as PBS that is adjusted at neutral pH (103). Viruses are usually 
eluted from the swab material in a separate elution step, by using lysis buffer directly, or by a 
combination of the two approaches. The elute pH seems to affect the viral recoveries. Taku and co-
workers (2002) reported higher recoveries, 36–50%, when glycine solution at pH 6.5 was used than 
when the viruses were eluted with a glycine solution at pH 9.5, at which time the recovery was 20–
35% (107). 
Surface samples may contain substances, such as the organic layer of soils that can inhibit the 
enzymatic activity of the reverse transcriptase and DNA polymerase enzymes used in RT-PCR assays 
(109). Thus, purification of HuNoV nucleic acids is needed before the RT-PCR assay. Nowadays, the 
RNA extraction is usually performed using commercial kits, such as those that involve the filtration or 
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treatment of the sample with chemical substances. Of the chemicals that are used in RNA extraction, 
Freon 113 (1,1,2-trichloro-1,2,2-trifluoroethane) and later, a more environmentally friendly 
substitute, Vertrel® XF (1,1,1,2,3,4,4,5,5,5-decafluoropentane), have been utilized to purify viruses 
from inter alia food matrices, for they can separate lipid matrices from polar molecules, such as virus 
RNA (110). Also phenol-clorophorm solution and later, a commercial guanidinium thiocyanate-
phenol-chlorophorm extraction Trizol®, have been used in HuNoV RNA extraction. The use of a 
mixture of guanidinium thiocyanate  together with the nucleic acid-binding properties of silica 
particles, followed by chloroform extraction and precipitation of nucleic acids in alcohol, was first 
described by Boom and co-workers in 1990 (111). Commercial systems are available, such as the the 
MiniMag System which have silica on the magnetic beads, and the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini kit system, 
in which the silica is built on a membrane in a column (112). 
2.7.4 RT-PCR methods 
Nowadays the most common method for detection of HuNoVs in several matrices is the reverse 
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) method (109). It was developed in the 1990s to 
identify HuNoV in faecal samples. Later, in 2003, Kageyama and co-workers compared the sequenced 
HuNoV genomes and found that the most conserved region of the genomes is the open reading 
frame 1 (ORF1)-ORF2 junction region (113). They used the most conserved sequences from that 
region to react with diverse HuNoVs to design primers and TaqMan probes that are suitable for 
detection of HuNoV GI and GII by RT-PCR or RT-QPCR. Both RT-PCR and RT-QPCR methods have been 
successfully used to identify HuNoV in clinical specimens in addition to food, water, and 
environmental surface samples. Being highly sensitive, they are especially useful for swab and other 
surface samples, for which the concentration of HuNoVs collected from surfaces are usually low, 
perhaps only a few viral particles per a square centimeter (103). 
In RT-PCR, the viral RNA template is first converted into a complementary DNA by using a reverse 
transcriptase enzyme (114). The complementary DNA is then used as a template for the exponential 
amplification using PCR. These two phases can be performed separately, or in the same test tube, 
which is referred to as one-step RT-PCR. After the amplification phase, the lengths of DNA, known as 
PCR products, are made visible by dyeing them using various fluorescent dyes and then separating 
the labeled products according to their electrical charge and molecular size by gel electrophoresis 
using electric current. A modification of RT-PCR method is RT-QPCR. When a target DNA sequence is 
amplified using RT-QPCR the amplification can be monitored during the PCR run in real time, and 
thus no later visualization of the DNA lengths is needed. The detection of the DNA is usually based 
either on TaqMan chemistry, which uses a labelled fragment of DNA called probe to detect the target 
DNA, or the use of a fluorescent dye, such as SYBR Green I (114). An example of TaqMan chemistry, 
modified from the work of Koch and co-workers (115), is given in Fig 5. 
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Fig 5. TaqMan hydrolysis probe principles (115). The 5'-nuclease activity of thermostable 
polymerases used in the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) cleaves hydrolysis probes during the 
amplicon extension step, which separates the detectable reporter fluorophore (R) from a quencher 
(Q). Fluorescence is emitted when excited by an external light source (hv) at each PCR cycle which is 
directly proportional to the amount of product formed. 
In RT-QPCR, the concentration of amplified DNA can be designated by absolute or relative 
quantification (114). In theory, absolute quantification measures the undisputed number of DNA 
length copies in the sample, when the strength of the signal from the target DNA is compared to the 
strength of the signal of several reference samples with known concentrations of DNA. One RT-QPCR 
detectable polymerase chain reaction unit (pcr-u) is usually defined as the highest 10-fold dilution of 
the reference samples with a positive signal. It is used to describe the relative copy number of DNA 
lengths in the tested samples. One pcr-u is not a universal copy number of the target DNA lengths, 
because it is dependent on the RT-QPCR conditions and the specific virus strain. Relative 
quantification measures the concentration of target DNA lengths compared to a known reference 
sample, whose concentration is at a certain level in certain conditions. Relative quantification is used 
inter alia for studying the differences in gene expression of bacteria under different conditions by 
comparing the expression levels of a studied gene to the expression level of a housekeeping gene in 
the same conditions. Quantification cycle (Cq) value indicates the number of amplification rounds 
before the fluorescence signal exceeds the threshold value of background fluorescence (114). A low 
Cq value indicates a high concentration of DNA in the sample, whereas high Cq value is an indicator of 
a low concentration of DNA. 
2.7.5 Other methods for molecular HuNoV detection 
Although RT-PCR is the most commonly used method for HuNoV detection nowadays, other options 
for molecular HuNoV detection are available. These alternative methods include reverse 
transcription loop-mediated isothermal amplification (RT-LAMP), in which amplification is carried out 
at a single temperature (116), reverse transcription helicase dependent amplification (RT-HDA), in 
which helicase enzyme is used to denature the DNA before amplification (117), and nucleic acid 
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sequence-based amplification (NASBA) (118). NASBA seems particularly useful for the detection of 
HuNoVs. It is an RNA amplification method that allows the use of the initial single stranded RNA 
genome as the template in the reaction. However, a drawback with this method is a low incubation 
temperature in the NASBA reaction that is thought to increase non-specific amplification during the 
reaction (119). 
2.7.6 Other methods for norovirus detection from surface samples 
The detection of HuNoVs in stool specimens using direct electron microscopy or immune electron 
microscopy requires high virus concentrations, which are usually observed only in faecal samples 
(109, 120). Therefore, this method is not feasible for the detection of HuNoVs from swabs. Similarly, 
Enzyme Immunoassay and Immunochromatography are too insensitive, although they are widely 
used for detetcting HuNoV in faecal samples. 
Although a cultivation technique for HuNoV is still currently not available, its surrogates, such as 
MuNoV, have been detected in cell cultures of experimentally contaminated environmental surfaces 
in the laboratory (40). These surrogate viruses, when analyzed in cell culture, are usually eluted from 
the surfaces by either a neutral buffer solution (pH 7.0), or cell culture media, as demonstrated by 
Tuladhar and co-workers (121). The eluted viruses are then analyzed in infectivity assays, such as a 
plaque assay, which determine the number of plaque forming units (pfu) in a virus sample. The 
pfu/ml value is obtained by observing lysed infected cells in the culture, and represents the number 
of infective particles within the sample. This determination is based on the assumption that each 
plaque formed is indicative of one infective virus particle. 
2.8 Persistence of noroviruses on surfaces 
Descriptions of outbreaks of gastroenteritis, where the cause of the outbreak has been confirmed to 
be HuNoV and the mode of spread was found to be via contact with environmental surfaces, suggest 
that HuNoV can stay infective on environmental surfaces for long periods of time. Human volunteer 
studies that concentrate on the survival of infective HuNoV on environmental surfaces have not 
been, however, published. In contrast, the viability of HuNoVs in groundwater has been shown to 
exceed two months (19). In another volunteer study, pressures of up to 600 megapascals (MPa) for 5 
min at RT were required to eliminate a 4 log10 load of HuNoV in oysters totally (18). 
Non-enveloped viruses, including HuNoVs, are generally more persistent in the environment than 
enveloped viruses, such as influenza viruses (17). The faecal-oral transmission route of HuNoVs and 
their transmission via the environment requires a viral capsid that is capable of withstanding the 
extremely low pH 3 of the stomach, in addition to the conditions outside of the human host. Survival 
in the environment is facilitated by protection of organic debris of faeces or vomit in which the virus 
is shed and virus aggregate formation occurs that offer protection from environmental stresses 
encountered on en route to new human hosts. Even relatively high temperatures do not inactivate 
the virus: HuNoV like particles have been shown to be highly stable at temperatures up to 55 °C 
(122).  
2.8.1 Persistence of noroviruses on environmental surfaces 
Various factors, including surface type, temperature, inoculum matrixes, and relative humidity, are 
reported to have an impact on how HuNoV remains viable on environmental surfaces (17). In most of 
the persistence studies conducted on HuNoV and its surrogates, viral RNA of these viruses was still 
observed even at the last measurement point of the trials, the longest interval being 56 days after 
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starting the experiment, as seen in Table 3. The infectivity of HuNoV surrogates on environmental 
surfaces decreased more rapidly than the persistence of the virus genome. The environmental 
surface, on which the HuNoVs and its surrogates had been inoculated, had little effect on the 
persistence of the viruses (20, 106). Keeping the surface samples at 4⁰C or 7⁰C rather that at RT, 
however, significantly facilitated the persistence of HuNoV on these surfaces as measured by 
genome detection (123, 124), and it also reduced the loss of infectivity of HuNoV surrogates (124). 
The effect of relative humidity on the infectivity of HuNoV surrogates on environmental surfaces was 
not evaluated, but 86% relative humidity was reported to facilitate HuNoV persistence compared to 
30% humidity (123). 
2.8.2 Persistence of noroviruses on human hands 
The ability to remain infective on human hands is crucial for HuNoVs. The faecal-oral transmission 
route requires the ingestion of HuNoV particles in order for the new host to get the infection. 
However, the presence of HuNoV on hands does not enable droplet infection, except in the relatively 
rare situations when viruses become airborne in droplets that were created by vomiting (50). 
Therefore, in most cases, HuNoV is transmitted from faecal matter of infected persons to their hands 
and via those hands to environmental surfaces and food. 
HuNoV persistence on hands has mainly been studied by using surrogate viruses or viruses 
resembling HuNoV in their environmental persistence, such as hepatitis A virus (125). In these 
studies, enteric viruses have been shown to survive on human hands for several hours. HuNoV RNA 
has been found in swabs taken from the hands of an ill food handler during outbreak investigation, 
which suggests prolonged stability of the virus on the hands (91). Recently, Liu and co-workers (2009) 
demonstrated that HuNoV RNA remained quite stable up to the end of their two hours trial (20). It 
thus seems that HuNoV survival resembles that of the other enteric viruses, although the decrease in 
infectivity could not be measured in their study. 
2.8.3 Persistence of norovirus on foods 
Viruses, unlike bacteria, are strict intracellular parasites and cannot replicate in foods. Therefore, 
viral contamination of food will not increase during processing, transport, or storage, and the 
contamination of food products is not detected by the senses. Nevertheless, due to the small 
infective dose of HuNoV, survival of even a fraction of these viruses on foods can lead to infection of 
the host when the contaminated foods are consumed. 
Previous studies on HuNoV persistence in foods suggest that temperature, food type, and virus strain 
are important variables when considering HuNoV survival on foods. Freezing facilitates HuNoV 
survival, as seen in many challenge studies, reviewed in Table 4. The virus persists much longer than 
the leafy green plants themselves at refrigeration temperatures. Differences in survival  of HuNoV 
surrogates on different foods has not been extensively studied, but the reduction of infectivity of 
MuNoV on lettuce, strawberries and raspberries has been similar at 4⁰C (126-128). Moreover, HuNoV 
persistence studies on environmental surfaces indicate that the viral genome can be detected in 
foods after much longer time periods compared to detection of the infectivity of HuNoV surrogates. 
In the following two Tables, 3 and 4, the persistence of HuNoV has been reviewed in more detail. 
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Table 3. Overview of persistence studies of HuNoV and its surrogates on environmental surfaces 
Reference Virusa Inoculum Inoculum 
matrix 
Surface Time 
points, 
days 
Temp-
erature 
Relative 
humidity 
Method for 
detection 
Persistence, days 
(106) FCV 
 
109 PFUb Cell culture 
media 
Formica 
 
Stainless 
steel 
 
Ceramic 
 
0, 0.02, 
0.042, 
0.083, 
0.17, 
0.33, 1, 
2, 7  
22±2 ⁰C 75–88% Plaque assay 7 
 
 
HuNoV GI 
 
 
104 pcr-uc Faecal 
suspension 
RT-PCR 7 
 
 
(124) FCV 5 * 105 PFU Artificial 
faecal 
suspension 
Stainless 
steel 
1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7 
4⁰C 54 % Plaque assay 7, reduction less than 1 
log10 
22⁰C 75–85% 7, reduction 2.5 log10 
MuNoV 
 
 
4⁰C 54 % 7, reduction 1.5 log10 
22⁰C 75–85% 5 
(129) MuNoV 108 PFU Cell culture 
media 
Gauze 
Nappy 
 -20, 
4,18,30⁰C 
 Plaque assay -20 ⁰C: 40 
4 ⁰C: 40, reduction 5.5 log10 
PFU 
18, 30 ⁰C: <2 
(130) 
 
 
 
 
 
HuNoV 
GII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 NASBA 
particle 
units 
Faecal 
suspension 
Stainless 
steel 
0.02, 4, 
7, 14, 
21, 35, 
49, 56 
7⁰C 86% NASBA 49 
30% not tested 
20⁰C 86% 28 
30% 7 
Plastic 
(PVC) 
7⁰C 86% 56 
30% not tested 
20⁰C 86% 28 
30% 7 
(20) HuNoV GI 107-109 
genome 
copies 
Faecal 
suspension 
Ceramic 
Formica 
Stainless 
steel 
42 ambient 
temp-
erature 
ambient 
relative 
humidity 
RT-QPCR 42, 0.4-1.2 log10 RNA 
reduction 
HuNoV 
GII 
28 28, 1.5-2.9 log10 RNA 
reduction 
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Table 3 continued 
(127) MuNoV 
 
 
 
105-106 
PFU 
Cell culture 
media 
Stainless 
steel 
42 ambient 
temperat
ure 
ambient 
relative 
humidity 
RT-PCR 42 
Plaque assay 42, 1.6 log10 RNA reduction 
(126) HuNoV GI 
 
HuNoV 
GII 
104 pcr-u Faecal 
suspension 
Formica 
Stainless 
steel 
Ceramic 
0-42   RT-QPCR  42, 1.5-2.3 log10 RNA 
reduction 
MuNoV 106.5 PFU Artificial 
faecal 
suspension 
Formica 
Stainless 
steel 
Ceramic 
RT-QPCR 
Plaque assay 
 
42, no RNA reduction 
21, 1.5 log10 PFU reduction 
Cell culture 
media 
Formica 
 
Stainless 
steel 
 
Ceramic 
RT-QPCR 
Plaque assay 
 
42, no RNA reduction 
14, 3 log10 PFU reduction 
 
Modified from (17). 
a HuNoV = human norovirus, MuNoV = murine norovirus, FCV= feline calicivirus, MS2= coliphage MS2  
b Plaque forming units 
c One pcr-u has been defined as the last dilution of the sample from which virus RNA could be amplified with RT-  
  PCR 
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Table 4. The persistence of HuNoV and its surrogates in foods 
Reference Virus Inoculum Inoculum 
matrix 
Food type Duration, 
temperature 
Method for 
detection 
Persistence, days 
(123) 
 
HuNoV GII 106 NASBA 
particle units 
Faecal 
suspension 
Lettuce  10 days at 7⁰C Real-time 
NASBA 
10, 1 log10 reduction in RNA levels 
Turkey meat 10, small reduction in RNA levels 
(131) 
 
MuNoV 6.3 log PFU 
2.5 log PFU 
Cell culture 
media 
Onion 
Spinach 
6 months at  
-21 ⁰C 
Plaque assay 180, very small reduction in 
infectivity 
(132) HuNoV GI  
HuNoV GII 
 
FCV 
105-106 pcr-u Faecal 
suspension 
Berries 
 
Parsley 
 
Basil 
90 days at  
-20 ⁰C 
RT-PCR 
 
Plaque assay 
90, less than 1 log10 reduction in 
RNA levels for both viruses 
90, 0.3-2.7 log10 reduction in 
infectivity, most prominent in 
strawberries 
(127) MuNoV 105-106 PFU Cell culture 
media 
Lettuce 15 days at 
ambient 
temperature 
Plaque assay 15, 1 log10 reduction in infectivity 
after 4 days 
RT-PCR 15, very low reduction in RNA 
levels 
(126) HuNoV GI  
HuNoV GII 
104 pcr-u 
  
Faecal 
suspension 
Lettuce 14 days at 
21⁰C or 4 ⁰C 
RT-PCR 14, 1 log10 reduction in HuNoV GI 
RNA, 1.2-1.8 in HuNoV GII RNA, 
very low reduction in MuNoV RNA 
MuNoV 
 
106.5 PFU Cell culture 
media 
RT-PCR and 
plaque assay 
14, 1.5 log10 reduction at 4 ⁰C, 3 
log10 reduction at 21⁰C 
(128) HuNoV GII 
HuNoV GI 
 
106-107 
genome 
copies 
Faecal 
suspension 
Raspberry 
Strawberry 
7 days at 4 ⁰C 
and 10 ⁰C 
 
RT-PCR and 
plaque assay 
7, very low reduction in RNA levels 
at 4 ⁰C, less than 1 log10 reduction 
in RNA levels at 10 ⁰C 
MuNoV Cell culture 
media 
3 days at 21 
⁰C 
3, reduction in infectivity: 
raspberries 1.1 log10, 
strawberries1.4 log10 
Modified from (17). 
a HuNoV = human norovirus, MuNoV = murine norovirus, FCV= feline calicivirus, MS2= coliphage MS2 
b Plaque forming units 
c One reverse transcription PCR unit (pcr-u) has been defined as the last dilution of the sample from which virus RNA could be amplified by using RT-PCR 
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2.9 Transfer of noroviruses between surfaces 
The transfer of HuNoVs from infected persons to foods or to environmental surfaces has been 
identified as the source of several large outbreaks of gastroenteritis in recent decades (16). Although 
the role of human hands and other fomites as transmission vehicles of HuNoVs has been suspected 
for a long time, laboratory evidence of the transfer has become available only recently (17). In these 
experiments the drying time of the inoculum and the pressure applied during the transfer have been 
seen to have a major influence on the transfer rates, calculated as the number of viruses transferred 
from donor to recipient surface divided by the total number of the viruses present on the donor 
surface before transfer. For instance in 2012, Sharps and co-workers reported that the proportions of 
HuNoV that transferred from gloved fingertips to fruit, gloves, or stainless steel were much higher 
when the virus did not have time to dry on the donor surface compared to after HuNoV had dried for 
30 minutes (133). In the same year, Escudero and co-workers showed that a pressure increase from 
100 to 1000 g/cm2 during MuNoV transfer from formica, stainless steel or ceramic to lettuce 
surfaces, increased the transfer rates from 0–4% to 8–20%, respectively (126). 
2.9.1 Transfer of noroviruses between human hands and food 
As described before, fresh food including berries and vegetables can become contaminated with 
HuNoV during harvesting, if the pickers working in the fields are infected and the level of hand 
hygiene is insufficient in the farms (8). At post-harvest phase, almost any type of food can become 
contaminated via a food handler, as a result of handling food without gloves while infected with 
HuNoV (80, 134). 
The transfer of HuNoVs from hands to food has been studied mainly using HuNoV surrogates. For 
instance in 2004, Bidawid and co-workers studied FCV transfer from fingerpads to food (ham and 
lettuce) and vice versa. These authors found mean transfer percentages as high as 46 ± 20.3% when 
contaminated fingers touched these surfaces, but only up to 14 ± 3.5% when clean fingers touched 
contaminated surfaces (135).  
A mean of 3.86 log10 genomic equivalent copies of HuNoV has been detected on the hands of 
infected persons who were experiencing gastroenteritis symptoms (136). Therefore, even low 
transfer rates from hands to foods can be important when considering the risk of the food picker or 
food handler contaminating foods with HuNoV while handling food items. 
2.9.2 Transfer of noroviruses between human hands and environmental surfaces 
The transfer of HuNoV from contaminated hands to environmental surfaces plays an important role 
in HuNoV transmission in hospitals and other facilities (100). HuNoVs that were detected by 
swabbing as a part of epidemiological studies, have often been detected on those environmental 
surfaces that are often touched by hands (100, 101). These environmental surfaces include handles 
of refrigerator and microwave ovens, soap dispensers and television consoles. 
Experimental studies have shown that HuNoV is easily transferred from hands to environmental 
surfaces. In 2004, Barker and his co-workers reported that fingers contaminated with HuNoV after 
contact with soiled toilet paper were capable of sequentially contaminating seven clean melamine 
surfaces upon touch (137). Bidawid and co-workers reported in their study that the transfer 
efficiency of FCV from fingers to stainless steel surface was 13 ± 3.6%, and from stainless steel to 
fingers 7 ± 1.9% (135). One potential transfer route for HuNoV via environmental surfaces could be 
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paper money and coins, which have been found to contain other pathogens that spread in the 
population via the faecal-oral route, such as Escherichia coli (138). 
2.9.3 Transfer of noroviruses between environmental surfaces and food  
Transfer of HuNoVs from environmental surfaces to food is considered a minor route of 
contamination compared to the transfer of the viruses from human hands to foods (16). 
Nevertheless, the transmission route is widely studied in the laboratory, using both HuNoVs and their 
surrogates in the experiments.  
In 2006, D’Souza and co-workers studied the transfer of HuNoV GI and FCV from stainless steel to 
lettuce surfaces (106). They found eight out of nine lettuce samples to be positive for HuNoV after 
coming into contact with the surfaces. The transfer efficiencies of FCV varied from 4.3% to 6.8% after 
60 min of drying when the lettuce on which the virus had been inoculated was wet and 0.2% to 4.9% 
after 60 min of drying when the lettuce had been dry. Sequential transfer of MuNoV to produce 
items was demonstrated by Wang and co-workers (135). In their study, contaminated produce was 
first prepared using knives and/or graters, and then the contaminated kitchen utensils were 
sequentially used to prepare seven produce items (cucumbers, strawberries, tomatoes, cantaloupes, 
carrots, or honeydew melons). In nearly all cases, the virus was detected on the seventh item 
prepared with the contaminated utensil (139). 
The transfer efficiencies from environmental surface to food and vice versa have also been studied. 
In 2012, Escudero and co-workers measured the transfer of a HuNoV GII to foods from 
environmental surfaces, and found transfer percentages of viruses to lettuce, 0–26%, to be lower 
than their transfer, 55–95%, to sliced turkey deli meats (126). 
Transfer of HuNoV from gloves to food has been only recently experimentally studied by Stals and 
co-workers (2013) (104). Those authors measured HuNoV and MuNoV transfer from contaminated 
nitrile gloves to sandwich components: meat, lettuce, and bun. They found different rates of transfer 
to each food type, ranging from 2.2%, obtained from boiled ham to 8%, obtained from a sandwich 
bun. Sharps and co-workers reported that the transfer rates of a norovirus cocktail, including HuNoV 
GII, HuNoV GI and MuNoV, to raspberries, blueberries and grapes after handling by operators 
wearing contaminated latex gloves varied on average from 25 to 108% when the inoculum did not 
have time to dry and from 5 to 65% when the inoculum was dry before transfers occurred (133). 
2.10 Inactivation methods for noroviruses on surfaces 
The environmental stability of HuNoVs has caused problems both in food producing chains and 
healthcare environments, probably for as long as these viruses have existed (1). Traditionally, food 
hygiene measures in food processing have been designed to control the growth of harmful bacteria 
in food, for instance by continuous chill chain (40). HuNoVs do not multiply outside human hosts and 
persist for long periods in the environment, thus cool and moist conditions enhance their survival 
instead of inactivating them. Consenquently, food hygiene solutions tailored to inactivate enteric 
viruses in addition to controlling bacteria are needed in order to prevent foodborne outbreaks. In 
healthcare environments, strict hygiene measures are regarded as a feasible way of controlling the 
transmission of HuNoVs (140). However, more accurate knowledge on the effects of inactivation 
methods against HuNoV is needed. For example the effect of several chemicals, such as ethanol 
based hand sanitizers, against HuNoVs are still unclear. 
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Inactivation, by definition, refers to the elimination or reduction in infectivity of a virus. According to 
European disinfection standards (141, 142), inactivation of viral infectiousness in the quantitative 
suspension test and environmental surface test by at least 4 log10 stages (= 99.99% titre reduction) 
must be achieved in all test batches at 20°C over a maximum of 60 minutes. Both chemical and 
physical inactivation methods, including disinfection with sodium hypochlorite, heating, and UV; 
have been tested against HuNoVs and other enteric viruses (8). As stated before, HuNoV infectivity 
cannot be measured in the laboratory except in volunteer studies, thus inactivation experiments 
have been performed using HuNoV surrogates, or the resistance of HuNoV particles including RNA, 
have been measured by genome detection methods (143). 
2.10.1 Inactivation using chemicals 
Chemical disinfection is the most common approach to interrupt the chain of HuNoV transmission via 
food contact and other environmental surfaces (21). The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) maintains a list of approved products for HuNoV disinfection, which was last updated in 
2009 (144). The list is based on the efficacy of the products against FCV, although this respiratory 
virus exhibits different physiochemical properties to those of HuNoV. At the moment, chemical 
agents are often tested on several surrogate viruses to assess the efficacy of these agents, as seen in 
Table 5.  
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (2011) recommend that environmental surfaces 
potentially contaminated by HuNoV should be disinfected using a sodium hypochlorite solution (21). 
The recommended concentration of chlorine bleach solution for treating hard, nonporous, 
environmental surfaces is in the range of 1 000–5 000 ppm. Although effective towards HuNoV 
surrogates (145-148), sodium hypochlorite apparently does not destroy HuNoV RNA completely, 
which leads to very little reduction of HuNoV levels detected by RT-QPCR (137, 149). Hydrogen 
peroxide, which is available as a slowly evaporating commercial product Oxivir®, and commercial 
product Virkon S®, have also been approved for HuNoV disinfection (144). 
There is some contradiction in the reports on the effects of alcohols against HuNoV. Only one 
commercial product containing ethanol has been registered with the EPA as being effective against 
HuNoV (144). Magulski and co-workers reported that 55–60% ethanol inactivated 6 log10 MuNoV 
over 5 min (150). Girard and co-workers reported that a disinfectant consisting of 2-(1-Butoxy) 
propanol and ethoxylated alcohols had no effect on either HuNoV or on MuNoV (146). 
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Table 5. Inactivation of HuNoV and its surrogates on environmental and other surfaces by chemicals. 
Reference Virus1 Inoculum Surface Chemical Concentration Affecting 
factors2 
Time, min Inactivation 
(151) FCV 9.5 log10 
TCID50 
Fabric: 
Cotton 
Polyester 
Carpets: 
Olefin 
Nylon 
Polyester 
2.6% glutaraldehyde 
Phenol compound 
Quaternary 
ammonium compound 
70% isopropanol 
undiluted 
 
1:128 
 
1:32 
 
 
undiluted 
 
 1, 5, 10 Fabrics: 
Glutaldehyde 10 min: 
100% 
Phenol compound 10 
min: 95-99% 
Q. ammonium 10 min: 
92-97% 
Isopropanol: 91-99% 
Carpets: 
Glutaldehyde 10 min: 
99-100% 
Phenol compound 10 
min: 60-96% 
Q. ammonium 10 min: 
17-95% 
Isopropanol: 68-97% 
 
(152) 
 
FCV 6.8 log10 
MPN 
Petri dish Calcium carbonate 100 and 1 000 
ppm 
20⁰C ± 2⁰C, 5%  10  100 ppm: 3.2 log10 MPN 
1 000 ppm: 6.6 log10 
MPN 
(145) HuNoV 
MuNoV 
MS2 
4-5 log10 
pcr-u 
5.3 log10 
PFU 
7-8 log10 
PFU 
Stainless steel 
Ceramic 
Sterilox hypochlorous 
acid 
50-190 ppm  1, 5, 10  188 ppm 1 min:  
MS2 3 log10 PFU both 
surfaces 
HuNoV 3 log10 pcr-u 
both surfaces 
38 ppm 5 min: 
MS2 3 log10 PFU both 
surfaces 
HuNoV 3 log10 pcr-u 
ceramic 
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Table 5 continues 
(150) MuNoV not 
reported 
 
Stainless steel  Peracetic acid 
Glutaraldehyde 
 
 
Ethanol  
1-propanol 
2-propanol 
 
50, 200, 500, 
1 000, 1500, 
2000, 2500 
ppm 
 
20-60 % 
 5  Peracetic acid 1 000 
ppm: 4 log10 
Glutaraldehyde 2 500 
ppm: >4 log10 
 
 
Ethanol 55% and 60%:  
6 log10 
1-propanol 40%, 50%, 
60%: 6 log10 
2-propanol 60%: 3 log10 
 
 
 
(146) HuNoV 
MuNoV 
104 pcr-u 
105 PFU 
Stainless steel  3% Sodium 
hypochlorite 
Ethoxylated alcohols 
(EA) 
Quaternary 
ammoniums (QA) 
 
1:1, 20 µl pH 12.3 
 
pH 9.8 
 
pH 10.7 
5, 10  Sodium hypochlorite 5 
min: 
MuNoV 5 log10 PFU, 
HuNoV 2 log10 pcr-u 
10 min: MuNoV 5 log10 
PFU 
HuNoV 3.5 log10 pcr-u 
EA 10 min: MuNoV, 
HuNoV not affected 
QA 10 min: 
MuNoV 1.5 log10 PFU 
HuNoV not affected 
(153) HuNoV 
MuNoV 
FCV 
MS2 
4.0 log10 
pcr-u  
4.8 log10 
PFU 
4.1 log10 
Stainless steel  Sodium hypochlorite 250, 500, 
1000, 2500, 
and 5 000 ppm 
pH 7.0 2, 4, and 10  5 000 ppm 2 min: 
HuNoV < 1 log10 pcr-u 
MuNoV 1.3 log10 PFU 
FCV 3 log10 PFU 
MS2 1.2 log10 PFU 
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PFU 
5.7 log10 
PFU 
all 
faecally 
soiled 
(154) MuNoV 3.8 g/liter 
50µl 
Stainless steel Hydrogen peroxide, 
liquid and vapour 
1%, 2%  5,10 1% 5 min: 2 log10 PFU 
1% 10 min: 3 log10 PFU 
2% 5 min: 2.9 log10 PFU 
2% 10 min: 3.1 log10 PFU 
(147) 
 
FCV 
MuNoV 
108–9 
TCID50/ml 
Stainless steel  Chlorine 0-5 000 ppm 22⁰C ± 2⁰C 0 to 5  5 000 ppm 5 min: 
FCV, MNV 5.20 TCID50 
(148) MS2 
MuNoV 
6 log10 
PFU 
Stainless steel 
PVC plastic 
Chlorine- 
based electrochemical 
oxidants (ECO)  
 
500-2 500 
ppm 
± 80 mg/liter 
humic acid 
30 s 1 000 ppm: 
MS2 6.9 log10 PFU  
2 500 ppm: 
MS2 7.3 log10 PFU  
MuNoV 1.7 log10 PFU  
5 000 ppm: MuNoV 2.4 
log10 PFU 
 
Data collected by the author. 
1HuNoV = human norovirus, MuNoV = murine norovirus, FCV= Feline calicivirus, MS2= coliphage MS2 
2Temperature and pH if reported     
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2.10.2 Inactivation using chemicals on human hands 
Appropriate hand hygiene is regarded as the single most important method to prevent HuNoV 
infection and control virus transmission nowadays (21). Ethanol hand rubs are commonly available 
and acknowledged to inactivate bacteria and respiratory viruses. However, they have been 
suggested to be ineffective against HuNoV. Therefore, the old hand hygiene method of washing 
hands with soap and water, in addition to certain types of hand sanitizers, have been tested 
alongside ethanol to find suitable methods for effective hand hygiene against HuNoVs. Standard 
test methods for the evaluation of hygienic hand wash and hand rub formulations have been 
developed to evaluate the effects of these sanitizers (155, 156). 
According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2010 Food Safety Survey, washing hands with 
soap and water before food preparation at home results in a reduction in the self-reported 
incidence of foodborne illness (157). Indeed, hand washing with soap and water has been shown to 
reduce the number of enteric microbes on the hands via the mechanical removal of these micro-
organisms (158). The procedure was observed to remove nearly 2 log10 PFU/ml of the HuNoV 
surrogate MS2 viruses from the hands. Liu and co-workers reported that the removal of HuNoV by 
soap and water was somewhat less effective, 0.67 to 1.20 log10 reduction in genomic copies (159). 
The inactivation of HuNoV by ethanol and other alcohols is shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Inactivation of HuNoV and its surrogates by chemicals on human hands. 
Reference Virus1 Inoculum Chemical Concentration Time Inactivation/Red
uction 
(160) FCV  10 µl 1:1 Ethanol 
1-Propanol 
2-Propanol 
70%, 90% 
 
30 s 0.83, 0.64 log10 
ID50 
0.92, 0.33 log10 
ID50 
0.50, 0.19 log10 
ID50 
(161) MuNoV 10 µl 1:1 Ethanol+ 
polyquaterniu
m-37+ 
citric acid 
Ethanol 
70% 
 
 
 
75%  
30 s 2.48 log10 PFU 
 
 
 
0.91 log10 PFU 
(159) HuNoV  6.7 log10 
genomic 
copies 
ethyl alcohol 62% 20 s 0.27 log10 
genome copies 
(162) FCV 
MuNoV 
10 µl 1:1 Ethanol 62% 
75% 
 
20 s 
30 s 
20 s 62-75%: 
FCV <1 log10, 
MuNoV 3 log10 
30 s 62%: 
FCV 2 log10, 
MuNoV 3.5 log10 
30 s 75%: 
FCV 2.2 log10, 
MuNoV 2.7 log10 
Data collected by the author. 
1 HuNoV = human norovirus, MuNoV = murine norovirus, FCV= Feline calicivirus 
2.10.3 Inactivation by physical inactivation methods 
Physical inactivation methods are suitable for HuNoV inactivation on those environmental surfaces 
that cannot, or are difficult to treat effectively with chemicals (21). Physical inactivation methods 
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include heating, ultrasound techniques, pressure treatment, non-ionizing and ionizing irradiation. 
These inactivation methods against HuNoV on surfaces have not been widely studied, because 
researchers have mainly focused on studying the inactivation of the virus in suspension (124, 163-
165). One study that did focus on inactivation of HuNoV surrogates on surfaces is reported by Schultz 
and co-workers, who in 2012 observed that a method combining heating and ultrasound inactivated 
MS2 almost completely, whereas the inactivation levels of two other surrogates, FCV and MuNoV, 
where also high but not complete, over 4 log10 PFU (166). Further details on the studies of 
inactivation of HuNoV on surfaces by physical inactivation methods are shown in Table 7. 
2.10.4 Inactivation by ultraviolet light irradiation 
UV is electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths shorter than visible light. UV can be separated into 
various frequency bands that range from 10 to 400 nm, including UVC between 280 to 100 nm. This 
narrow spectral range UV (more specifically 254 nm) is considered harmful to micro-organisms, 
including viruses for it disrupst the double-bond stability of adjacent carbon atoms in molecules 
including pyrimidines, purines and flavin (167). UV inactivation of micro-organisms results from the 
formation of dimers in RNA (uracil and cytosine) and DNA (thymine and cytosine). UV has been used 
for a long time to disinfect drinking water, natural water, and waste water (168). More recently, UV 
has been used in hospitals and other health care facilities to sanitize air and environmental surfaces 
(140, 169). Most publications that describe the sanitation effects of UV on HuNoV have been carried 
out as suspension tests (129, 149, 170-172). According to de Roda Husman and co-workers, UV at a 
fluence of 120 J/m2 (12 mJ/cm2) was able to cause a 3 log10 reduction of FCV in suspension (173). 
 Jean and co-workers studied the effects of UV on MuNoV on surfaces in 2011, and reported that UV 
was effective against this HuNoV surrogate, as long as the surfaces were free of soil (Table 7)(174). 
They also reported that the reduction of MuNoV on stainless steel and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) 
surfaces at a fluence of 60 mJ/cm2 was 5 log10. 
Table 7. Inactivation of HuNoV and its surrogates on surfaces by physical inactivation methods. 
Reference Virus1 Inoculum Surface Method Time Inactivation 
(154) MuNoV 3.8 g/l 50 µl Stainless steel UV  5 min 2.9 log10 PFU 
(174) MuNoV 5 log10 PFU Stainless steel 
Polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC) 
UV, 60 mJ/cm2 
Presence/ 
absence of 
foetal bovine 
serum (FBS), 
pulsed UV  
 
2, 3 s Stainless 
steel: 
Clean: 5 log10 
FBS: 3.6 log10 
PVC: 
Clean: 5 log10 
FBS: 2.3 log10 
(166) MNV 
FCV 
MS2 
6.43 log10 
PFU 
6.5 log10 PFU 
9.8 log10 PFU 
Petri dish Steam-
ultrasound,  
160 dB, 130 ⁰C 
0–3.0 s 3 s: 
MNV 4 log10 
PFU 
FCV 4.5 log10 
PFU 
MS2 9 log10 
PFU 
Data collected by the author. 
1HuNoV = human norovirus, MuNoV = murine norovirus, FCV= feline calicivirus, MS2= coliphage 
MS2 
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2.11 Discrimination between infectious and non-infectious HuNoV 
Currently, the infectivity of HuNoVs can only be determined by human volunteer studies (40). These 
studies are very expensive and although the results that have been achieved by them are definitive, 
they are ethically problematic to carry out because there is no curative treatment to be given to 
those volunteers who develop gastroenteritis symptoms after being exposed to the virus and the 
volunteers suffer. The permission process to carry out volunteer studies can also be difficult. These 
foregoing reasons have entailed the following alternative approaches to be developed to study 
HuNoVs: determining the physical presence of HuNoV RNA and using cultivable surrogate viruses. 
Surrogate viruses have been reviewed in 2.4, whereas this chapter focuses on discrimination 
between infectious and non-infectious HuNoVs using RT-PCR or RT-QPCR. 
PCR techniques can indicate the presence and quantity of HuNoV RNA in a sample by copying and 
indicating a part of a strand of nucleic acid that was transcribed from RNA to DNA. This strand of RNA 
must be intact for the copying to take place, but the rest of the genome, and also the viral capsid, can 
be damaged. A variable part of a virus batch used in the experiments consists of damaged viruses, 
therefore non-infective viruses are almost always present before inactivation studies are initiated. 
Thus it is not surprising that considerable difference in HuNoV surrogate persistence is reported 
between infectivity assays and RT-PCR assays (164, 175). Different pre-treatments will already have 
been included in the PCR assays to exclude the non-infective HuNoVs that were present in the 
sample prior the RT-PCR assay. Four approaches have been applied: PCR has been modified to target 
longer regions than usual to increase the probability of copying only intact genomes, infectious virus 
particles will have been captured exclusively so that only they are analysed in the PCR assay, non-
infectious viruses will have been degraded by enzymatic activity, or they will have been bound so 
that the enzymes in PCR assay do not recognize them or they will have already been discarded 
before the assay (40). 
Analysis of a long target region of the viral genome during amplification has been suggested to help 
in distinguishing non-infective and infective viruses, as the damage done to the viral genome is more 
likely to fall on multiple sites (176). Unfortunately, this approach has been reported to reduce the 
sensitivity of PCR detection, which can lead to a possible underestimation of the concentration of 
infective viruses in the samples. 
An immunocapture technique has been suggested as an effective means to collect only infectious 
enteric viruses from environmental samples and thus distinguish them from non-infective virus 
particles (176). In this method, viruses are attached to an antibody, present on a surface of a 
paramagnetic bead, and then separated from the sample matrix by a magnet. The target virus can 
then be released from the antibody and subsequently detected by PCR methods. Although it is able 
to distinguish between infective and non-infective polioviruses, the method has been shown not to 
differentiate similarly another enteric virus, hepatitis A virus (177). The method is also highly 
dependant on the nature of the capturing antibody. Thus, the applicability of the technique for 
determining and quantifying HuNoVs remains unclear and requires further research. 
In a widely used approach to degrading the virus samples by enzymatic activity, proteinase enzyme 
breaks up the protein coat of damaged HuNoVs and RNAase digests the viral RNA (171, 178), as seen 
in Fig 6. Protocols also exist were RNAase is used alone (179). In 2002, Nuanualsuwan and Cliver used 
 40 
 
proteinase K enzyme to break down the damaged virus particles, which resulted in negative signals in 
traditional RT-PCR from inactivated FCV samples (171).  
Although enzymatic pre-PCR treatment has been a more widely used approach to discriminate 
between infectious and non-infectious HuNoV, other treatments have also been described. One such 
approach is based on the binding properties of infective viruses to porcine gastric mucins, which 
results in the unbound virus particles being discarded and thus not copied in the PCR assays (168). 
Ganglioside GD1a (attachment receptor of MuNoV on RAW 264.7 cells) has also been suggested to 
apply as receptors in a similar manner (180). In another approach to binding-based RT-PCR detection 
of infectious HuNoVs, propidium or ethidium monoazide was allowed to penetrate through damaged 
or compromised virus capsids and bind covalently to viral RNA upon exposure to visible light, which 
made this bound RNA unavailable for amplification (181, 182). An alternative approach that is based 
on the detection of carbonyl groups produced by oxidation on viral capsid protein has also been 
described (183). 
 
Fig 6. The principle of enzymatic pre-PCR treatment using proteinase and RNAse enzymes. Illustration 
by the author. 
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3 AIMS OF THE STUDY 
 
The objectives of this work were to develop a feasible protocol for HuNoV detection in samples 
obtained from environmental surfaces and to apply this protocol in a laboratory setting for 
investigation of HuNoV transfer, in addition to field studies on the incidence of HuNoV on 
environmental surfaces. Further objectives of this work were to demonstrate the effectiveness of UV 
against HuNoV on environmental surfaces and to determine, whether infectious and non-infectious 
HuNoV particles could be differentiated by an enzymatic pre-PCR treatment.  
 
The specific aims were to: 
1. Optimize an environmental surface sampling protocol for two components of the methodology, 
namelly: the swab materials and the buffer solutions, then collect optimal recoveries of HuNoVs 
from different surfaces (I) 
2. Determine the transfer of HuNoV from hands to gloves during gloving, and from contaminated 
hands of the food handler or from contaminated food ingredient to food servings during a 
simulated preparation of a cucumber sandwich (II) 
3. Use the developed swab sampling protocol to investigate HuNoV incidence in a setting where a 
HuNoV outbreak was suspected and also in an environment where no outbreak had been 
reported (I,III, unpublished data) 
4. Examine the persistence of HuNoV and its surrogate MuNoV to UV: by measuring the decrease of 
infectivity (MuNoV) and the decrease of viral RNA levels (both viruses) (IV).  
5. Analyse whether the enzymatic treatment for virus particles could differentiate infectious and 
inactivated viruses from one another thus making the results of the PCR method closer to that of 
the true infectivity level (IV)  
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4 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
An overview of the laboratory methods used in this thesis is given in Fig 7. 
 
 Fig 7. An overview of the laboratory methods used in the thesis. 
Swabbing of 
environmental or 
food surfaces in the 
field 
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laboratory 
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RT-QPCR with QuantiTect Probe RT-PCR kit (Qiagen) and the Rotorgene 3000 
detection system  
Viability assay 
in RAW 264.7 
cells 
Genotyping with RT-QPCR or RT-PCR 
Semi-direct elution of the viruses: elution of viruses from 
the swabs and lysis of the viruses 
Pre-RT-QPCR 
 
Inoculation of HuNoV GII or 
MuNoV onto test surfaces in 
the laboratory 
Inoculation of HuNoV GII or MuNoV onto test 
surfaces in the laboratory 
Transfer 
experiments 
Optimization 
of swabbing 
method (I) 
Persistence 
of human 
norovirus in 
swabs (I) 
Transfer of 
MuNoV 
HuNoV 
GII(II) 
Field studies 
(I,III, 
unpublished) 
UV 
inactivation, 
persistence 
(IV) 
UV 
inactivation, 
viability (IV) 
Incubation of 
HuNoV in 
swabs 
RNA extraction with NucliSENS® miniMAG® (Biomerieux, Boxtel, The 
Netherlands) kit 
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4.1 Viruses (I-IV) 
Three viruses, HuNoV GI, HuNoV GII, and MuNoV (MNV-1) were used in this research, as described in 
Table 8. 
Table 8. An overview of the use of the viruses in the research 
 
Protocol 
Inoculation dose for each protocol 
HuNoV G II.4 HuNoV G I.6 MuNoV MNV-1 
Stock RT-QPCR 10 log10 pcr-u/ml 8 log10 pcr-u/ml 10 log10 pcr-u/ml 
Stock infectivity assay - - 7 log10 PFU/ml 
Optimization of 
swabbing 
4 log10 pcr-u or  
2 log10 pcr-u in 100 µl 
 
  
Persistence of HuNoV in 
swabs 
2 log10 pcr-u in 100 µl 
 
  
Transfer of MuNoV and 
HuNoV while putting on 
latex gloves 
6 log10 pcr-u in 100 µl 
 
 
 
 6 log10 pcr-u in 100 
µl 
MuNoV and HuNoV 
transfer during the 
manual preparation of 
deli sandwich 
3.5 log10 pcr-u in 100 µl 
 
 
 
 
 3.5 log10 pcr-u in 100 
µl 
UV inactivation 8 log10 pcr-u in 100 µl  8 log10 pcr-u or  
5 log10 PFU in 100 µl 
 
Process control   4 log10 pcr-u in 5 µl 
PCR positive control 3 log10 pcr-u in 5 µl 3 log10 pcr-u in 5 µl 3 log10 pcr-u in 5 µl 
4.1.1 Human noroviruses (I-IV) 
Stool samples that contained either HuNoV GII.4 or GI.6 were diluted into 10% suspensions in PBS 
(pH 7.2). The suspensions were cooled to 5 °C for 2 h and then frozen at -70 °C in aliquots. The 
concentrations of viral RNA in both of the virus stocks were estimated by RT-QPCR endpoint dilution 
(Table 8). A standard curve was plotted for sequential 10-fold dilutions of RNA, and one RT-QPCR 
detectable pcr-u was defined as the highest 10-fold dilution of the sample, which shows a positive 
result with Cq < 40. 
4.1.2 Murine norovirus (I-IV) 
MuNoV was obtained from Dr. Herbert W. Virgin at the Washington University School of Medicine 
(St. Louis) and was cultured in RAW 264.7 cells (ATCC-CRL-2278) in high-glucose Dulbecco’s Modified 
Eagle’s Medium (DMEM), which contained 10% heat-inactivated foetal bovine serum (FBS, Gibco), 10 
mM 4-(2-hydroxyethyl)-1-piperazineethanesulfonic acid (HEPES), and 1% glutamine-penicillin-
streptomycin. The cells were grown under standard conditions at 37 °C with 5% carbon dioxide (CO2) 
and maintained according to animal cell culture protocols (184). Cells from passage 2 to passage 20 
were used for the experiments. 
MuNoV stock was produced by cultivating the viruses on confluent RAW 264.7 cell monolayers for 2 
to 3 days, until the cytopathic effect was observed. The virus stock was prepared according to Park 
and co-workers (2011) by ultrafiltration of the cell lysate (Amicon Ultra-15; Millipore, Billerica, MA, 
USA) at 4500 x g for 10 min at 4 °C, and filtration through a 0.2 µm syringe filter prehandled with 
Polysorbate 20 solution (Sigma, Saint Louis, MO, USA) (149). The resulting MuNoV stock was stored 
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in aliquots at -70 °C. The concentration of viral RNA was estimated to be similar to those of the 
HuNoVs by RT-QPCR endpoint dilution (Table 8). 
4.2 Swabbing method (I-III) 
The swabbing method was used in the studies I, II, and III, and in the one-year HuNoV prevalence 
study (unpublished data). 
4.2.1 Swabs (I-III) 
Four swabs: polyester sticks (175KS01, Mekalasi Oy, Finland), flocked nylon sticks (500C50, Mekalasi 
Oy, Finland), cotton wool sticks (Selefa Trade, Sweden), and microfiber cloths (Taski Microcare, 
Novakari Oy, Finland) were all compared to obtain an optimum swabbing method for HuNoV on 
environmental surfaces (I). The microfiber cloths were previously tested by Suvi Laukkanen in her 
licenciate thesis (185). Two lots of these microfiber cloths (1 manufactured in 2010 and 2 
manufactured in 2011), both similarly made of 85% of polyester and 15% of polyamide, were cut into 
1.5 cm x 5 cm pieces and riveted to a holder to handle them with tweezers. Microfiber 2 cloths and 
cotton wool swabs were used in the field study, which surveyed the presence of HuNoV on 
environmental surfaces in companies manufacturing RTE food products (I and unpublished data). 
Polyester swabs, consisting of a polyester tip and nylon handler, were used in transfer studies (II). 
3M™ EnviroSwabs (ENVSWB25, 3M, Finland) were used in HuNoV outbreak investigation (III). 
4.2.2 Test surfaces in the laboratory (I,II) 
Cucumber and three environmental surfaces, low-density polyethylene or PELD plastic, stainless 
steel, and latex surfaces, were used in the optimization of the swabbing method (I). For transfer 
studies, cucumber and latex glove surfaces were also used, in addition to sterile stainless steel knives 
and plastic pipette tip box covers, which are referred henceforth in this thesis as ‘breads’ (II). Hands 
of the researcher, who participated in the study as study subject, were washed with soap and water 
and left to dry before inoculating MuNoV on them or putting latex gloves on for the inoculation of 
HuNoV (II).  
4.2.3 Inoculation of the surfaces before swabbing in the laboratory (I,II) 
HuNoV GII and MuNoV stock solutions, which were used for the inoculation of all test surfaces, were 
diluted in sterilized water to the planned concentrations according to Table 8. The 5 cm squares on 
the test surfaces in the optimization study and the persistence study (I) were inoculated evenly with 
one 100-µl portion of either virus. In the transfer studies (II), the cucumbers were inoculated in 
similar a manner to that used in the optimization study.  The palms of the bare hands and the palms 
of the latex gloves on the gloved hands of the palm area were evenly inoculated. Drying times at 
room temperature (RT) in a fume hood before sampling were as follows: overnight for environmental 
surfaces inoculated with HuNoV in study I, 60 mins for cucumber surface inoculated with HuNoV in 
study I, 60 mins for environmental surfaces in the persistence evaluation study (I), and 60 mins for all 
samples in study II. 
4.2.4 Buffer solutions and swabbing method (I-III) 
Swabs were moistened in their assigned flasks, which contained 2 ml of either PBS (pH 7.2) or 50 mM 
glycine buffer pH 9.5 (subsequently referred to as glycine buffer). The exception was 3M™ 
EnviroSwabs, which were moistened with 5 ml of PBS. Swabbing was done by wiping the surface 
rapidly in an up and down motion while steadily moving across the surface. After careful wiping for 
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one minute, swabs were placed back in their flasks, which contained either one of the two buffer 
solutions mentioned above. 
4.3 Persistence study setting (I) 
On four consecutive days in two subsequent weeks, PELD plastic surfaces were inoculated with 
HuNoV GII, then left to dry for 60 min, and swabbed with PBS or glycine buffer moistened microfiber 
2 cloths, as described under heading 4.2, on each day of the experiment. After swabbing, the cloths 
were returned to their tubes and were placed on a horizontal plane at either 4⁰C or 22⁰C until the 
end of the experiment. 
4.4 Swabbing in field studies (I,III, unpublished data) 
In the field studies, swab samples were taken from those surfaces that were frequently touched by 
bare hands. In the companies producing RTE foods, sampling focused on the production lines, the 
break rooms and the restrooms of the companies. In the resort, sampling took place in the common 
areas, the quest rooms, and the kitchen. A summary of the field studies is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Swabbing in field studies 
Study Year Swab, elution 
buffer  
Person 
responsible 
for 
swabbing 
Examples of swabbing 
sites 
Number of 
samples 
Delivery of 
the samples 
to the 
laboratory 
HuNoV 
prevalence (I) 
2010 
2012 
Microfiber 2 
cloth, cotton 
wool swab, 
glycine buffer 
Author Production line: 
control panels 
Break rooms: coffee 
machine 
Restrooms: toilet seat 
 
172 Transport in 
cooled 
styrofoam 
box within  
12 h 
HuNoV 
prevalence, 
one-year 
study 
(unpublished) 
 
2011 
 
Microfiber 2 
cloth, PBS 
Food 
industry 
employee 
Break rooms: coffee 
machine, microwave 
oven, refrigerator 
Restrooms: toilet seat 
168 Transport by 
mail at 
variable 
temperatures 
within 3 d 
Outbreak 
investigation 
(III) 
2012 3M™ 
EnviroSwabs, 
PBS 
Outbreak 
investigator 
Resort centre: 
Kitchen: freezer door 
handle 
Common rooms: door 
handles 
The quest rooms: 
toilet seat 
36 Transport in 
styrofoam 
box at 4⁰C 
within 12 h 
 
4.4.1 One-year study on the prevalence of norovirus, questionnaire 
A questionnaire study for food industry employees was conducted during 2011 with swab sampling 
in the one-year study (Table 9). The questionnaire was in two parts: the first period exclusively 
covered to the first seven months of the year (January—July, 2011) and the second, the remaining 
year (August—December, 2011). The respondents were asked how many times and when they had 
experienced gastroenteritis symptoms during the two follow up periods, as well as if they had had 
contact with symptomatic family members. The respondents were also asked if they had worked 
while symptomatic or if they had returned to work immediately after they had recovered. 
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4.5 Virus transfer trials (II) 
The transfer study consisted of two parts. First, the transfer of HuNoV and MuNoV was monitored in 
samples obtained from transfer from virus contaminated hands to latex gloves during gloving. 
Second, the transfer from virus contaminated donor surfaces to recipient surfaces was observed 
after simulated preparation of a cucumber sandwich. Inoculation of the viruses on all the test 
surfaces was carried out as described under heading 4.2.3, doses according to Table 8. Swabbing was 
performed as also described under heading 4.2.4, using polyester swabs and the glycine buffer 
solution. 
4.5.1 Transfer of MuNoV and HuNoV while putting on latex gloves 
The transfer of MuNoV from bare hands to gloves was observed, as was the transfer of HuNoV from 
worn latex gloves to a clean pair of gloves. Gloving was performed the same way in every trial. The 
test person took the gloves from a container with the left hand and then put a glove on the right 
hand first and then the left hand. HuNoV transfer during gloving was not only tested after a drying 
period of 60 min post inoculation, but also without drying. 
4.5.2 Transfer of MuNoV and HuNoV during the manual preparation of a sandwich 
To test virus transfer between surfaces in the process of manually preparing a cucumber sandwich, 
MuNoV or HuNoV was seeded onto the test person’s latex gloved right or left hand or on half of a 
cucumber before the manual preparation began. The preparation of the cucumber sandwich was 
performed as follows: (1) the right-handed test person took a hold on the cucumber with the left 
hand, (2) took the knife into the dominant right hand, (3) cut six slices off the cucumber, (4) and 
placed the slices on top of the bread with the right hand. Swab samples were taken from the 
following surfaces: (1) the palm and fingers of the glove of the right hand, and then (2) from the left 
hand, (3) the whole knife, (4) the outer surface of the cucumber, (5) the surfaces of cucumber slices, 
and (6) the top and sides of the bread. 
4.6 Ultraviolet light inactivation (IV) 
UV was generated by an ozone-free low-pressure mercury-vapour discharge lamp (Sylvania G15T8, 
London, UK) with the peak wavelength set at 253.7 nm and an output of 0.48 ± 0.02 mW/cm2. The 
lamp was switched on for 10 minutes at room temperature (RT) to reach its maximum output before 
starting the experiments. Subsequently, the UV intensity was measured by a digital UVX radiometer 
(IL Metronic Sensortechnik GmbH, Germany). 
Before the UV treatments commenced, HuNoV and MuNoV suspensions (Table 8) were inoculated 
on a circular thin layer of ᴓ 100 mm on a glass slide and dried in a flow hood for 1–2 hours at RT. The 
UV doses used in the viability assays were 0, 7.5, 15, 30, 60, 90, 120 and 150 mJ/cm2, whereas doses 
in the PCR assay were 0, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 300, 450, 600, 750, 900 and 1800 mJ/cm2. 
4.7 Virus elution from swabs (I-III)  
A semi-direct lysis method was used for virus elution from all swabs. First, swabs were shaken in an 
orbital shaker (IKAKS 2060 basic, Patterson Scientific, UK) at 250 rpm for 10 min at RT. Then, 4 ml (10 
ml in case of 3M™ EnviroSwabs, study III) of NucliSENS® miniMAG® lysis buffer (bioMerieux, Boxtel, 
The Netherlands) was added to each flask and shaking was repeated to ensure the maximum elution 
of viruses from the swabs. RNA extraction was continued using the fluid content of the flasks. A total 
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of 6 ml of fluid was obtained. Out of 15 ml fluid content of the flasks used with 3M™ EnviroSwabs, 9 
ml was stored at -21⁰C. 
4.8 Virus elution from glass slides (IV) 
MuNoVs that were used for the infectivity assay were eluted from the slides with 500 µl of DMEM 
containing 2% foetal bovine serum 100µl at a time with back-and-forth pipetting and the infectivity 
of the virus samples was determined by a viability assay. HuNoVs and MuNoVs that were being 
prepared for RT-QPCR detection were eluted from the slides with 500 µl of sterile H2O. 
4.9 Viability assay (IV) 
The viability assay for MuNoV is described in the paper authored by Verhaelen and co-workers (128). 
In short, 100 μl aliquots of each dilution of concentrated MuNoV, prepared in DMEM with 2% instead 
of 10% FBS, were seeded into a 96-well plate, that contained 2 × 104 RAW 264.7 cells/well (Nunc A/S, 
Roskilde, Denmark). Each dilution was added to six parallel wells on the plate and the plates were 
incubated in the standard conditions and checked daily for the presence of a cytopathic effect. The 
tissue culture infectious dose (TCID50/ml) and PFU/ml were calculated using the protocol described 
by H. Morales (186). 
4.10 Pre-RT-QPCR treatment (IV) 
The protocol for the pre-RT-QPCR was modified from that described earlier (123, 171). The protocol 
was optimized by testing three doses of pronase, 3 mg, 6 mg, and 9 mg and two doses of RNAse, 0.02 
mg and 0.04 mg before carrying out the pre-RT-QPCR treatment. The following protocol was selected 
for the study: 6 mg of pronase enzyme was dissolved in sterile H2O (200 mg/ml, Roche) then mixed 
with the virus sample and the whole was shaken at 37 °C for 10 min. The reaction was stopped by 
adding 2 µl of 200 µM phenylmethane sulfonyl fluoride (Aldrich Sigma Canada Ltd., Oakville, Ontario, 
Canada) to the suspension, and the suspensions were left at RT for 15 min. RNAse (0.04 mg, Roche 
Diagnostics, Indianapolis, IN, USA) was subsequently added and the mixtures were incubated at 37 °C 
for 40 min, after which 80 U of RNAse inhibitor solution (Promega US, Madison, WI, USA) was added. 
The protocol was then continued with the RNA extraction phase. 
4.11 RNA extraction (I-IV) 
RNA extraction was performed according to the manufacturers instructions given in the NucliSENS® 
miniMAG® (Biomerieux, Boxtel, The Netherlands) kit, apart from the following steps: 60 µl of 
magnetic beads were added to the sample tube instead of 50 µl in studies I, II and III, and the 
samples were shaken in an orbital shaker at RT at 150 rpm for 10 minutes instead of incubating them 
without shaking. 
4.12 RT-QPCR (I-IV) 
Detection of the viruses was performed using a QuantiTect Probe RT-PCR kit (Qiagen, Hilden, 
Germany) with primers and a probe, showed in Table 10, specific to each virus. Each reaction used a 
20 µl volume that contained 10 µl of QuantiTect Probe RT-PCR Master Mix, 0.2 µl of QuantiTect RT 
mix, 0.4 µl of RNAse-free water, 1 µM each of both primers, 0.2 µM of probe, and 5 µl of the sample 
RNA solution. Amplification was performed with the Rotorgene 3000 detection system (Corbett Life 
Science, Sydney, Australia) under the following conditions: initial activation for 25 min at 50°C, 
second activation for 15 min at 95°C, followed by 45 cycles, during which two phases, one cycle at 
95°C for 15 sec and another at 60°C for 60 sec, rotated. Measurements of fluorescence were 
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performed after the annealing step. In the data analysis, the threshold of the PCR was set at 0.02 
with a cut-off of 40. 
Table 10. Primers and probes used for RT-QPCR (I-IV) 
Virus Primer + Primer - Probe References 
HuNoV GII QNIF2d (+) COG2R (-) QNIFS (+) (187) 
HuNoV GI QNIF4(+) QNIF3 (-) JJV1P (112) 
MuNoV MNVfor MNVrev MNV (188) 
 
4.13 Genotyping/Sequencing (I,III) 
HuNoV positive samples from study I and from the one-year study of HuNoV prevalence 
(unpublished data) were screened for GII.4 genotype using a specific set of primers (F1 5’-act ctc tgt 
gca ctc tcc gaa gt-3’ and R2 5’-gct ttg ctg tca act tct ctg g-3’) published in 2012 by Maunula and co-
workers  (189). The samples were subjected to RT-QPCR using a SYBR green I PCR kit (Qiagen, Venlo, 
the Neatherlands) and Rotorgene RG-3000 PCR cycler. A melting curve analysis was performed, and 
samples with a melting temperature of 79 ± 0.5 ⁰C were regarded as positive. 
Sequencing of the HuNoV isolates in study III was done as follows: HuNoV RNA was amplified using a 
one-step RT–PCR kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) according to the method described by Vinjé and co-
workers with a degenerate primer set from the capsid protein (VP1) region (190). After this, nucleic 
acid sequences of the amplicons were determined at the DNA Sequencing Service, in the Institute of 
Biotechnology, University of Helsinki. A genotyping tool (www.rivm.nl) and BLAST search in Genbank 
were used for genotype determination. 
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4.14 Controls 
The controls in the studies are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. Controls used in the studies (I-IV) 
 Control 
Sample handling RNA 
extraction 
RT-QPCR, RT-PCR 
Study Parallel 
samples 
Process 
control 
Negative 
sample 
Negative 
sample 
RNA 
duplicates 
Positive 
samples1:  
Negative 
sample 
Non-
template 
control 
Optimization of 
swabbing (I) 
 
+ (2)  + + + + + + 
Persistence of 
HuNoV in 
swabs (I) 
 
+ (3)  + + + + + + 
Transfer while 
putting on latex 
gloves (II) 
 
+ (3)  + + + + + + 
Transfer during 
the manual 
preparation of 
a deli sandwich 
(II) 
 
+ (3)  + + + + + + 
HuNoV 
prevalence (I) 
 
 +  + + + + + 
One-year study 
(unpublished) 
 
 +  + + + + + 
Outbreak 
investigation 
(III) 
 
 +  + + + + + 
UV inactivation 
(IV) 
+ (4 * 3)  + + + + + + 
1 HuNoV GI, HuNoV GII and/or MuNoV depending on the expected viruses in the samples 
 
4.15 Virus recovery rate and transfer rate calculations (I,II,IV) 
The recovery rates were calculated as the pcr-u count expressed as a proportion of the viruses 
recovered from surfaces divided by the observed original pcr-u count of the virus inoculation dose 
multiplied by 100% (I, II, IV). The transfer rates were similarly calculated by expressing the pcr-u 
count of the acceptor surface as a percentage of the inoculation dose (II). The calculated transfer 
rates in study II were converted from the transfer rates by the following pattern: transfer rate x 
(100/observed virus recovery rate of the acceptor surface from study I). The inactivation levels were 
measured by comparing the titres of the viruses after the inactivation treatment to the titres of the 
viruses before the treatment (IV). 
4.16 Statistical testing (I,II) 
Statistical analysis for study I was performed using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), used to 
compare means of two or more sample groups, followed by the Bonferroni post-test with a cut-off of 
0.05 to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons. Set as statistical significance the analysis 
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was performed using GraphPad Prism version 4.03 for Windows (GraphPad Software, San Diego, CA, 
www.graphpad.com). HuNoV and MuNoV transfer rates in study II were analyzed statistically with 
the student’s t-test in SPSS software (SPSS Statistics, International Business Machiness, New York, 
USA) to determine if two sets of transfer data were significantly different. Significance was 
determined at the 0.05 level. 
4.17 Statistical models (II,IV) 
Two Bayesian statistical models, constructed by Antti Mikkelä, Evira, were used in the thesis. The first 
was used for analysing HuNoV and MuNoV transfer studies. The second used the data and the 
information from the publication by Qian and co-workers (191). Computations of the models were 
performed with WinBUGS 1.4.3 or OpenBUGS software (192). The number of MCMC iterations was 
10000. 
4.17.1 Statistical model used for the transfer studies (II) 
The data consisted of the calculated MuNoV and HuNoV transfer efficiencies converted from the raw 
pcr-u transfer data, based on the findings that the two viruses transferred in similar quantities during 
the simulation study. 
The aim of the modelling was to evaluate the extent of HuNoV contamination in the prepared 
cucumber sandwiches and their associated contact surfaces, when the virus contamination 
originated from either the hands of the food handler or from a single food ingredient. It was assumed 
that the observed transfer rates from hand to glove during the glove changing hgTc , from glove to 
food ingredient during contact gfTc , and from food ingredient to glove during contact fgTc , follow a 
Beta distribution: 
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1,...,6j  ),,(Beta~Tc
1,...,11i   ),,(Beta~Tc
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=
=
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   (1, Antti Mikkelä) 
where i, j, and k denote the number of trials. A conventional uninformative Exponential (0.01) 
distribution was used as a prior for both of the parameters of the Beta distributions.  
A predicted transfer rate from a food handler to food was gfpred
hg
pred TcTc ⋅ , where the values of  
hg
predTc  
and gfpredTc  were simulated from their posterior predictive distributions. The predicted transfer rate 
from food ingredient to food was gfpred
fg
pred TcTc ⋅  , where the values of 
fg
predTc  and 
gf
predTc  were 
similarly simulated from their posterior predictive distributions. 
The predicted amount of HuNoV contaminated food servings after repeatedly preparing cucumber 
sandwiches was modelled for two scenarios. In the first scenario, the hands of the food handler were 
assumed to contain initially loads from 1 to 4 log10 of virus particles before gloving and preparing a 
series of sandwich servings. In the second scenario, the first single food ingredient (cucumber) that 
the food handler touched before preparing a series of sandwiches was also assumed to contain a 
load that ranged from 1 to 4 log10 virus particles. The amount of HuNoV particles on gloves was 
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assumed to decrease during every contact so that the expected amount of virus particles remaining 
on the gloves after t preparations with the same gloves, :)E( tx  
))Tc1log(t(gl
t
gf
predn)E(x
−⋅⋅= e     (2, Antti Mikkelä) 
where ngl is the initial expected amount of HuNoV on the gloves, transferred from either hands or 
from the initial single food ingredient, hgpred
h Tcn 0 ⋅  or, fgpred
f
0 Tcn ⋅  according to chosen scenario 1 or 2. 
The expected amount of viruses in the next food serving yt+1 was then 
gf
predt1t Tc)E(x)E(y ⋅=+     (3, Antti Mikkelä) 
4.17.2 Statistical model for the UV inactivation studies (IV) 
The aim of the modelling was to determine the relationship between UV doses and the reduction of 
MuNoV and HuNoV particles on dry surfaces.  A Deviance Information Criterion was used to compare 
different regression models (192, 193).  
The slope parameter (βuv) and the precision parameter (τ) were estimated from the data. Both 
parameters were given practically uninformative prior distributions: 
,0.01)Gamma(0.01~τ
)Norm(0,100~β 2uv     (1, Antti Mikkelä) 
After testing several competing regression models, the following model fitted best to the data: 
 
)1log(μ
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µ
     (2, Antti Mikkelä) 
The response variable (Yi,j) that used is the log10 inactivation of the MuNoV or the HuNoV. The values 
of the response variable (inactivation in the ith UV dose level in the jth trial) were analytically 
calculated from the data. The intercept parameter (α) of the model was fixed at zero, so that no 
inactivation should take place when the UV dose was zero. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Optimization of the swabbing method (I) 
A previously existing protocol (104) was optimized for swab material and elution buffer for two 
inoculation doses of HuNoV in order to find a feasible swabbing method for detecting HuNoV on 
environmental surfaces. A semi-direct lysis technique, in which both the elution buffer and lysis 
buffer are used to detach viruses from swabs, was introduced as part of the swabbing protocol. 
When 2 log10 pcr-u of HuNoV had been inoculated onto latex, plastic, and stainless steel surfaces and 
the virus-inoculated surfaces had been swabbed by one of the following: polyester, flocked nylon, 
microfiber, or cotton wool swabs, the virus was detected in all tested swab materials in every trial. 
The recovery rates were calculated as the mean recovery rate for the three environmental surfaces, 
and they varied from 27.8 ± 15.2% to 78 ± 15.1%, as seen in Fig 8. The difference in recovery rates 
between the swab materials was statistically significant (p<0.05) only when comparing the 
combination of microfiber 1 cloth and glycine buffer elution to the other materials and elution buffer 
combinations. HuNoV recovery rates for polyester swabs were slightly higher than the corresponding 
rates for cotton wool and flocked swabs, but this could not be confirmed statistically due to the high 
variance in recovery rates of single trials. Glycine buffer at pH 9.5 was beneficial for the recovery of 
HuNoV when the viruses were eluted from swabs of microfiber 1 cloth, flocked and polyester swabs, 
whereas eluting the viruses from swabs using PBS as the solution produced higher recovery rates for 
cotton wool swabs and microfiber 2 cloths. The lowest recovery rate was obtained from a latex 
surface was 11.1 ± 5.2% (flocked swab, PBS), whereas the two highest rates were 41.2 ± 9.0% 
(polyester swab, glycine buffer) and 66.2 ± 18.0% (microfiber 1 cloth, glycine buffer). The recovery 
rates from plastic surfaces varied from 25.1 ± 9.5% (flocked swab, PBS) to 88.7 ± 1.7 % (microfiber 1, 
glycine buffer), and the recoveries from stainless steel varied from  26.1 ± 12.6% (flocked swab, PBS) 
to 79.0 ± 10.2% (microfiber 1, glycine buffer). 
 
Fig 8. HuNoV recovery rates (%; mean ± SD) using the surface swab sampling protocol. Results of 
three environmental surfaces in study I, PELD plastic, stainless steel, and latex surfaces, have been 
combined. Inoculation dose was 2 log10 pcr-u in 100 µl (Table 8). 
Microfiber 2, PBS, 60.4 % 
Cotton wool, glycine buffer, 29.8% 
Cotton wool, PBS, 36.1% 
Flocked, glycine buffer, 29.5% 
Flocked, PBS, 27.8% 
Microfiber 2, glycine buffer, 31.3% 
Microfiber 2, PBS, 38.6% 
Microfiber 1,  
glycine buffer, 78.0% 
Polyester, glycine buffer, 42.1% 
Polyester, PBS, 38.7% 
1  
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When the experiments were repeated with a 4 log10 pcr-u inoculation load of HuNoV, a dramatic 
decrease in recovery rates was observed, which affected the virus recovery rates obtained for all 
swab materials that were available and for all environmental surfaces. Only microfiber 2 could be 
acquired for this trial from batches of microfiber cloths. The recovery rates, calculated as an average 
of all tested environmental surfaces as described before, varied from 12.6 ± 0.9% (flocked swab, PBS) 
to 40.9 ± 10.8% (polyester swab, glycine buffer). The advantage of using either one of the two elution 
buffers was less clear on the results obtained with the higher of the two inoculation doses, except for 
the recovery rates of HuNoV obtained from latex surfaces: the rates were higher when glycine buffer 
was used in the elution of the viruses.  
The mean recovery rates of HuNoV, which were calculated from the combined results of all swab 
materials were the lowest (7.6 ± 2.3%, PBS and 16.8 ± 3.6%, glycine buffer) when detecting viruses on 
latex surfaces, and the highest, (40.4 ± 6.2%, PBS and 43.1 ± 4.7%, glycine buffer) when detecting 
viruses on stainless-steel surfaces. When swabbing the outer surface of the cucumber, the lowest 
virus recoveries (15.8 ± 2.7%) were obtained for the polyester swab using the PBS buffer for the 
elution, and the highest (45.2 ± 5.2%) for the microfiber 2 cloth using PBS for the elution. 
The stability of HuNoV in microfiber 2 cloths was evaluated as changes in ct-values at 4⁰C and 22⁰C 
on days 0, 1, 2, and 3, as seen in Fig 9. All samples remained positive for HuNoV over the incubation 
time regardless of the temperature or buffer solution used. The reduction in viral RNA was less than 
1.4 log10 pcr-u during this time. The reduction curves at 4⁰C between days 0 and 1, were less steep 
than at 22⁰C. There was, however, no difference in overall reduction rates of HuNoVs between the 
two temperatures at the end of the experiment. 
The HuNoV levels in microfiber 2 cloths at 4⁰C that had been moistened with either PBS or glycine 
buffer, showed similar reduction curves with no statistical differences (Fig 9A). The reduction of 
HuNoV on day 1 was small, but the largest drop in virus levels was seen between days 1 and 2. At 
22⁰C, the reduction curves of the viruses on PBS- or glycine buffer - moistened cloths differed 
statistically (p<0.05) on day 1 (Fig 9B). HuNoV levels on PBS-moistened cloths were reduced only 1.5 
log10 in 24 h, whereas the levels of the virus on glycine buffer moistened cloths was reduced by as 
much as 3.8 log10. On day 2, the difference between the two sample types was still pronounced, but 
on day 3 there was no longer difference between them. 
Based on the stability results presented in Fig 9, buffer solution for the prevalence studies, shown in 
Table 9, was chosen case-by-case, taking into consideration the time from the swabbing to the start 
of laboratory analysis. 
 54 
 
 
Fig 9. Reduction of HuNoV RNA levels in microfiber cloths that were moistened with either PBS or 
glycine buffer (pH 9.5) and incubated at 4⁰C (panel A) or 22⁰C (panel B). 
5.2 Transfer of noroviruses (II) 
Transfer studies on HuNoV and its surrogate MuNoV were conducted in two parts to enable the 
estimation for the extent of the virus transfer from bare hands of a food handler to the sandwich 
servings. These were the gloving experiment and the experiment on HuNoV or MuNoV transfer 
during the preparation of cucumber sandwiches. The two parts of the transfer study were then 
combined to mathematically estimate the expected transfer rates of HuNoV and the expected 
amounts of sandwich servings that could become contaminated by the virus, when the virus was 
present on the food handlers’ hands prior to gloving and sandwich preparation. 
5.2.1 Gloving experiment 
MuNoV was used as a surrogate for HuNoV in the transfer experiments. Transfer from either hand to 
the latex gloves was observed repeatedly, overall 10/12 times (83.3%), as seen in Table 12. The 
transfer rates of MuNoV RNA to gloves varied from 0.1% to 7.0% when the left hand was 
contaminated by the virus and from 0.0% to 0.2% when the right hand was contaminated. The 
calculated transfer rates of virus particles revealed a difference in the rates between left or right 
contaminated hands, though this could not be verified statistically. The mean calculated transfer 
rate, converted from virus recovery rate of 33% for the latex surface, from the left contaminated 
hand to both recipient gloves was 6.1 ± 5.6%, while the corresponding value for the right hand was a 
mean rate of only 0.2 ± 0.1%.  
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When HuNoV was used in the experiments, the virus was inoculated onto the gloved hands before 
donning a clean pair of latex gloves. HuNoV RNA was transferred from the gloved hands to the clean 
donned gloves 10/12 times (Table 12). The transfer rates of HuNoV varied from 0.0% to 8.7% 
regardless of the inoculation site (left or right hand). No statistical difference in transfer rates was 
observed between the HuNoV and MuNoV results in these trials. 
The transfer of HuNoV was also investigated by donning gloves immediately after inoculation of 
HuNoV. Virus transfer was then observed 11 out of 12 (91.7%) times. The mean concentration of 
viruses on the swabbed gloves (6.1 log10 pcr-u per hand) was higher (P < 0.05) when the virus 
inoculation remained wet than when it was left to dry (5.0 log10 pcr-u per hand). 
5.2.2 Transfer of MuNoV or HuNoV during the preparation of cucumber sandwiches 
MuNoV transfers between a donor surface (left-hand glove, right-hand glove, or outer surface of a 
cucumber) and acceptor surfaces (left-hand glove, right-hand glove, outer surface of a cucumber, 
cucumber slices, knife and bread) were investigated in the process of simulating a manual 
preparation of a cucumber sandwich (Table 12). The transfer of MuNoV from cucumber or individual 
gloves to the first acceptor surface was detected in every trial. The highest virus transfer rates in the 
trials were observed from a glove to cucumber (0.5–1.6%), followed by the rates from cucumber to a 
glove (0.4–1.3%). The smallest virus transfer rates were observed from a cucumber to a knife 
(<0.1%), from a glove to a bread (<0.1%), and from a glove to a knife (0.1-0.5%). MuNoV was more 
easily transferred from gloves than from cucumber to acceptor surfaces: the remnant mean recovery 
rate from artificially virus-contaminated glove surfaces was 5.8±5.7% and 6.6±6.1% for the left and 
right hand, respectively, whereas the remnant recovery rate from cucumber surfaces was 
18.4±26.4%. 
HuNoV was transferred from the donor surfaces to the acceptor surfaces in quantities similar to 
those of MuNoV. However, in one experiment, HuNoV was transferred from the cucumber surface to 
acceptor surfaces more extensively than MuNoV. HuNoV was also more widely transferred to the 
gloved left hand and a knife to the gloved right hand and to a bread. As in the MuNoV trials, more 
virus particles were transferred from the glove to a cucumber contact (0.2–4.3%) than vice versa 
(0.2–0.9%), although this could not be confirmed statistically. 
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Table 12. Virus recoveries, transfer rates, and calculated transfer rates of MuNoV and HuNoV between surfaces after gloving, and in the manual preparation 
of cucumber sandwiches (II). 
Virus 
 
Inoculation site 
 
Inoculation dose Surface 
 
Virus concentration 
log10 pcr-u/ml 
Recovery  
% (pos/total) 
Transfer rate 
 % (pos/total) 
Calculated transfer rate % 1 
MuNoV Left hand 6 log10 pcr-u  
    
   left hand 5.6±5.2  1.5±0.5 (3/3) 4.4±1.5 
   right hand 6.0±5.2  2.6±3.2 (3/3) 7.8±9.6 
 Right hand 6 log10 pcr-u      
   left hand 0.0±3.0  0.0±0.0 (1/3) 0.0±0.0 
   right hand 4.5±4.4  0.1±0.1 (3/3) 0.3±0.2 
        
 Cucumber 3.5 log10 pcr-u      
   cucumber 4.7±4.8 18.4±26.4 (3/3)   
 
  right hand <12    
 
  left hand 3.3±3.1  0.7±0.5 (3/3) 2.1±1.6 
 
  knife 1.7±1.9  0.0±0.0 (1/3) 0.3±0.5 
 
  cucumber slices 2.9±2.4 0.3±0.1 (3/3)   
 
  ‘bread’ <1    
 
Left hand 3.5 log10 pcr-u      
 
  cucumber 3.6±3.1  1.2±0.6 (3/3) 5.4±3.1 
 
  right hand nc3    
 
  left hand 4.2±4.1 5.8±5.7 (3/3)   
 
  knife <1    
 
  cucumber slices <1    
 
  ‘bread’ <1    
 
Right hand 3.5 log10 pcr-u      
 
  cucumber nc    
 
  right hand 4.3±4.2 6.6±6.1 (3/3)   
 
  left hand nc    
 
  knife 2.9±2.7  0.2±0.2 (3/3) 0.4±0.3 
 
  cucumber slices <1    
 
  ‘bread’ 0.0±1.6  0.0±0.0 (2/3) 0.1±0.1 
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Table 12 continues       
HuNoV Left hand 6 log10 pcr-u  
    
   left hand 4.0±2.9  0.1±0.0 (3/3) 0.3±0.0 
   right hand 4.2±4.0  0.1±0.1 (2/3) 0.4±0.3 
 Right hand 6 log10 pcr-u      
   left hand 5.7±5.5  3.6±3.6 (3/3) 11.0±10.9 
   right hand 4.4±4.5  0.2±0.3 (2/3) 0.7±1.0 
 Cucumber 3.5 log10 pcr-u      
   cucumber 4.2±4.2 7.9±7.1 (3/3)   
 
  right hand 1.9±2.1  0.0±0.1 (1/3) 0.1±0.2 
 
  left hand 2.9±2.7  0.4±0.2 (3/3) 1.2±0.7 
 
  knife 3.3±0.3  0.4±0.1 (1/3) 0.1±0.1 
 
  cucumber slices 2.3±2.5 0.0±0.1 (3/3)   
 
  ‘bread’ 1.9±2.1  0.0±0.1 (1/3) 0.2±0.2 
 
Left hand 3.5 log10 pcr-u      
 
  cucumber 3.7±3.8  2.2±2.9 (3/3) 10.1±16.0 
 
  right hand nc    
 
  left hand 4.3±3.7 8.2±1.2 (3/3)   
 
  knife <1    
 
  cucumber slices <1    
 
  ‘bread’ <1    
 
Right hand 3.5 log10 pcr-u      
 
  cucumber nc    
 
  right hand 4.3±3.7 7.0±0.7 (3/3)   
 
  left hand nc    
 
  knife 2.7±2.8  0.2±0.3 (2/3) 0.4±0.5 
 
  cucumber slices <1    
 
  ‘bread’ <1    
1 When converting the calculated transfer rates the following recovery rates were used: outer surface of cucumber 22%, surface of plastic 27%, surface of 
stainless-steel 62%, and surface of latex gloves 33% 
2 Under the detection limit 1 log10 pcr-u 
3 No contact with virus 
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5.2.3 Expected transfer of HuNoV 
Using the Bayesian analysis, which utilized the data from both gloving experiment and sandwich 
preparation simulation as prior information, estimations were formed of the probabilities for HuNoV 
transfer from hands to food servings during manual preparation of cucumber sandwiches. As a result 
of this analysis, HuNoV-contaminated hands of a food handler were calculated to transfer the virus 
during the preparation to more sandwich servings than a sporadic HuNoV contamination of a single 
food ingredient. It was calculated that if 3 log10 HuNoV particles were present on the hands of the 
food handler before gloving and food preparation, there would still be 50 % chance that the 8th 
cucumber sandwich would be contaminated with at least one infective HuNoV. If, however, the same 
amount of particles, i.e. 3 log10, were present on the surface of a cucumber, the probability of 
transfer to even the first serving would be less than 5%. 
The expected number of HuNoVs on the first sandwich, when the hands of the food handler were 
contaminated with 3 log10 infective virus particles, would be less than 2 as has been illustrated in Fig 
10 A. However, if the hands were contaminated by 4 log10 or more infective virus particles, the 
expected load of HuNoVs on the first serving would already be more than 10 virus particles, as seen 
in Fig 10 B.  
 
Fig 10. The expected number of HuNoV particles transferred on food after preparing a series (0-50) 
of food servings. The hands of the food handler had either 3 log10 (panel a) or 4 log10 (panel b) load of 
HuNoV particles before gloving and manual preparation of food servings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
5.3 Prevalence of noroviruses on environmental surfaces (I,III, unpublished data) 
Environmental swabs were collected from food industry premises with no reported gastroenteritis 
outbreaks, an also from an activity centre where a suspected HuNoV outbreak had taken place. 
Although analysed for the presence of both HuNoV GI and GII RNA, only HuNoV GII was detected in 
the swab samples from both sites, as seen in Table 13.  
In HuNoV prevalence studies conducted during spring in 2010, HuNoV was detected in five swabs, 
three of which were detected on the production lines that produced RTE foods and the rest on 
surfaces in break rooms. All positive findings from the production line and two of the findings from 
the break rooms were from a single company. In 2012, HuNoV was detected in three swabs collected 
from break rooms, in four swabs collected from restrooms in two separate companies that produced 
RTE foods. In a one-year prevalence study conducted in 2011, four positive samples were taken from 
break rooms in January, May and November from a single company. During the HuNoV prevalence 
studies in 2010-2012, 12 out of 16 of the HuNoV positive samples were typed as HuNoV GII.4 by 
screening primers. 
In the resort centre where a HuNoV outbreak was suspected, HuNoV RNA was detected in 10 swab 
samples. HuNoVs could be sequenced from three of the swabs and revealed the genotype GII.4 
Sydney_2012. After the virus had been detected in the resort, the resort was cleaned and more swab 
samples were taken to verify its success in eradicating the virus from the resort. The cleaning was not 
a complete success, for HuNoV was still detected in one room in the resort. After second round of 
thorough cleaning, HuNoV was no longer detected.  
Table 13. Prevalence of HuNoV in field experiments in RTE companies and one resort 
Study Swab, elution 
buffer  
Positive 
samples, 
genotype 
HuNoV positive swabbing sites and surfaces 
HuNoV 
prevalence (I) 
Microfiber 2 
cloth, cotton 
wool swab 
12/172, 
7% 
10/12 GII.4 
Production line: a handle of a knife,  a cover of a 
box containing raw produce, gloves of an 
employee 
Break rooms: coffee machine, microwave oven 
Restrooms: toilet flushing knobs, door handles 
 
HuNoV 
prevalence, 
one-year 
study 
(unpublished) 
 
Microfiber 2 
cloth, PBS 
4/168, 
2.4% 
2/4 GII.4 
Break rooms: coffee machine, microwave oven, 
refrigerator 
 
Outbreak 
investigation 
(III) 
3M™ 
EnviroSwabs, 
PBS 
10/36, 
27.8% 
3/10 GII.4 
Sydney_2012 
Kitchen: freezer door handle 
Common rooms: door handles 
Hotel rooms: mattresses, toilet seats, tap 
handles, soap devices 
 
A questionnaire was given to food industry employees to inquire about their gastroenteritis 
episodes. Data from the questionnaire and the study were related to the one-year study of HuNoV 
prevalence on the environmental surfaces of the food industry premises. The total number of 
respondents in the study was 190, which gave a response rate of 63%. According to respondents, 
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38.9% of the food industry employees had suffered gastroenteritis symptoms at least once during 
the first period of the study (January—July 2011) and 20.3% during the second. The peak of illness 
was in March and the symptoms had lasted for a mean of 2–3 days. About 50% of the respondents 
admitted working at least once while suffering from gastroenteritis symptoms. 
5.4 UV Inactivation of noroviruses (IV) 
UV inactivation of noroviruses was investigated by two means: MuNoV inactivation was measured 
using a viability assay and the reduction in viral RNA levels for both MuNoV and HuNoV was 
measured by using RT-QPCR. For each UV dose given two parallel sample groups were detected using 
RT-QPCR: one group was enzymatically pre-PCR treated with pronase and RNAse enzymes, and the 
other was not treated enzymatically. The results are shown in Figure 11. 
5.4.1 Inactivation of MuNoV with UV irradiation 
The levels of viable MuNoVs, measured in the RAW 264.7 cells, were observed to decrease in two 
phases: the virus titre decreased rapidly from 5 log10 PFU to 2.7 log10 PFU when the UV fluence was 
increased from 0 mJ/cm2 to 7.5 mJ/cm2, after which the decrease was more moderate, from 2.7 log10 
PFU to 1 log10 PFU when the UV fluence was increased from 7.5 mJ/cm2 to 60 mJ/cm2. A total loss of 
infectivity was achieved at a fluence of 90 mJ/cm2 at a 3 min time point. 
5.4.2 Decrease in MuNoV and HuNoV levels measured using RT-QPCR 
The decrease in virus levels detected by RT-QPCR, when the virus-contaminated surfaces were 
treated by UV, was UV dose-dependent and data between MuNoV and HuNoV were comparable, as 
seen in Figures 11 A and C, respectively. When the UV fluence was increased gradually from 0mJ/cm2 
to 300 mJ/cm2, MuNoV levels decreased from 4.5 log10 pcr-u to less than 3.5 log10 pcr-u (Fig. 11 A). 
Positive PCR signals were, however, detected even when the UV fluence was as high as 1800 mJ/cm2. 
The RNA reduction curve of HuNoV was less steep than that of MuNoV as the levels of HuNoV 
decreased from 4.4 log10 pcr-u to 3.8 log10 pcr-u when UV fluence was increased from 0 mJ/cm2 to 
300 mJ/cm2 (Fig. 11 C). 
Enzymatic pre-PCR treatment using pronase, RNAse, or both was validated before inactivation and 
virus stability experiments in study IV by using the same protocol on either MuNoV samples that did 
not receive UV treatment or samples that received maximum UV, 1800 mJ/cm2. The combination of 
pronase and RNAse enzymes was chosen, for it was the only pretreatment option that did not show a 
positive signal for MuNoVs in RT-QPCR after treatment. 
The addition of enzymatic pre-PCR treatment to the UV protocol caused a total decrease of 4–5 log10 
in MuNoV levels when UV fluence was 1800 mJ/cm2, as can be seen in Figure 11 B. The total decrease 
in pre-PCR treated HuNoV levels was somewhat smaller, 2.5–3 log10, with the same UV fluence, 
demonstrated in Figure 11 D. 
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Fig. 11. Observed reduction rates (circles) and prediction distributions (dashed lines) for the expected 
reduction rates of MuNoV and HuNoV GII, either with no enzymatic pre-PCR treatment (A, C) or with 
enzymatic pre-PCR treatment (B, D) (IV). 
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6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 Swabs as a tool in epidemiological investigations and prevalence studies (I,III) 
Outbreaks of gastroenteritis that are caused by HuNoV have become a major public health concern, 
especially during the last decade (1). The modern lifestyle, which includes travelling and eating food 
that is intensively handled, facilitate HuNoV circulation in the population. Furthermore, the 
population is comprised of larger groups of immonocompromized persons, such as those suffering 
from cancer, to which the HuNoV infection could be serious, even fatal. Effective control and 
prevention of the disease depends, in part, on the identification of the source of contamination. 
Reports of HuNoV outbreaks indicate that in addition to the transmission of these viruses via food 
and water, contamination of environmental surfaces significantly contributes to the spread of this 
virus during outbreaks (16). The distribution of HuNoVs in the environment can be studied by 
detecting HuNoVs on environmental surfaces by swabbing (103). The swabbing protocol was fast and 
easy to follow. It has been successfully used in large follow-up studies, in continuous monitoring of 
environmental surfaces in food processing companies, catering companies, hospitals, and in elderly 
homes (100). 
At present, researchers use multiple techniques to recover and quantify viruses, including HuNoV, on 
surfaces (103). The recovery rate of viruses, detected in swabs taken from environmental surfaces, 
depends on two features: the effectiveness of the swab to collect the viruses from environmental 
surfaces and the effectiveness of elution of viruses from the swab. The first is the interaction 
between the features of the virus, the swabbed surface, and the characteristics of the swab, whereas 
the second is a result of interaction between the swab, the viruses, and the elution buffer. Swabs 
rarely have any biological substances on their surfaces before swabbing and thus can not provide 
receptors for viruses. Therefore, the interactions between the virus and the swabs are purely non-
biological. 
Physical features of environmental and food surfaces, such as porosity seem to affect the fraction of 
HuNoVs that can be collected from these surfaces. In general, the easiest collection of HuNoVs is 
from smooth and hard surfaces such as ceramic and stainless steel (104, 107), as also seen in study I. 
Most HuNoV findings in epidemiological studies have as well been obtained from hard and non-
porous surfaces, such as toilet seats and toilet handles and taps (100). Gloves of food handlers have 
been rarely examined for HuNoVs in field studies, but in the laboratory, HuNoVs have been 
recovered from various glove materials. Stals and co-workers (2013) reported that the recovery rate 
for HuNoVs in swabs of vinyl gloves was approximately 40% (108), whereas the recovery rates for 
latex gloves in our study were lower, 30% with a 2 log10 inoculation dose or a mean of 21% for 
inoculation doses 2 log10 and 4 log10. In contrast, Suriyanarayanan and co-workers reported higher 
recovery rates from latex than from vinyl gloves (194), by using the glove juice technique where 
buffer solution is poured inside the gloves on hands and virus is recovered from the buffer (195). 
Recovery rates obtained from different surfaces varied in our study despite our efforts to achieve a 
controlled test environment, as seen also in other studies (104, 108). The high variability may be due 
to the heterogeneous structures of test surfaces, variable attachment of the virus to these surfaces, 
virus aggregation and the low number of repeated experiments. 
Virus removal from environmental surfaces can be interpreted as virus recovery of the swab. 
Microfiber cloths have been shown to remove 3.5 log10 PFU of HuNoV surrogates MuNoV and FCV 
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from solid surfaces by wiping, which indicated these were potential swabbing materials for HuNoV 
sampling (105). In a recent review of virus surface sampling methods, the authors observed that 
several papers reported that viruses have been detected from surfaces most reliably with antistatic 
sampling materials, such as microfiber cloths, followed by polyester, cotton and rayon swabs. 
Similarly, the highest mean recovery rates of MuNoV and HuNoV in this study were achieved when 
microfiber cloths were used for sampling. However, even small differences in microfiber cloths, such 
as electrical charge, seem to affect virus recovery rates, as was seen in our study with microfiber 1 
and microfiber 2 cloths, whose material composition and the weaving were reported to be identical, 
but their performance differed. A feasible explanation might be that the production process of 
microfiber cloths may have changed between manufacturing the two batches of cloths used in the 
study, which would influence virus attachment or release. 
Glycine buffer at pH 9.5 was seen slightly more effective than PBS at pH 7.2 in eluting viruses from 
microfiber cloths and polyester swabs in our study. The electrochemical adhesive interactions 
between the glycine buffer moistened swabs and the viruses may have been stronger than when 
swab had been moistened in neutral buffer. The persistence of HuNoV particles and RNA in swabs 
was, nevertheless, hindered if the swabs were moistened by glycine buffer instead of PBS before 
sampling and the persistence of the viruses was measured at RT. Biophysical methods have shown 
that decreased persistence of HuNoV-like particles can result from changes in the secondary 
structure of HuNoVs at pH levels over 8 (122). 
In the three field studies included in this present research, the swab samples were collected by 
different persons who used different swab materials and elution buffers. Nevertheless, HuNoV could 
be detected in swabs in all three studies (Table 13). In Finland, the HuNoV incidence according to the 
register by National Institute for Health and Welfare during seasons 2010, 2011 and 2012 was 2 700, 
1600 and 1800 cases respectively (Fig 3). It thus seems that strains of HuNoV, including Sydney_2012 
variant at the time of the outbreak investigation study (III) in 2012, were circulating actively in the 
Finnish population during the time of the field studies. Not surprisingly, the highest fraction of 
HuNoV positive samples was found during the outbreak investigation (27.8%), although HuNoV has 
been detected even more often in swabs taken during outbreak investigation in hospitals (196). 
Prevalence study in food manufacturing companies with no known HuNoV outbreak showed that the 
fraction of positive findings was somewhat higher than the prevalence of 1.7% reported in 2011 by 
Boxman and co-workers for environmental swabs taken in catering companies (101). One reason for 
this may be that Boxman and her group collected the swabs from restaurants throughout a single 
year, whereas in the current study the prevalence was investigated at the same time in the springs of 
2010 and 2012, when HuNoV prevalence in the population is usually at its annual peak (22). The 
prevalence of HuNoV in our one-year study was only 2.4%. One reason for this may be that swabs 
were transported to the laboratory by mail under varying temperature conditions, which may have 
decreased the level of HuNoVs in the swabs under the detection limit of the sampling method. In 
further studies, alternative means for transport could increase the amount of HuNoV findings from 
swab samples. According to the questionnaire, responses of the employees of the RTE companies, 
conducted during the follow-up year, the employees had mostly suffered from gastroenteritis in the 
early spring. Two of our positive HuNoV findings were also from that same time period. 
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6.2 The role of food handlers in norovirus transmission (I,II,III) 
Food workers have been one of the known sources of foodborne HuNoV outbreaks for as long as 
HuNoV outbreaks have been recorded, and it seems the trend is continuing (16). Multi-ingredient 
foods have been most frequently noted to be involved in foodborne HuNoV outbreaks, perhaps 
because of the intensive handling during preparation, which may have increased the chance for 
contamination (14). In HuNoV outbreaks where a food handler connection has been confirmed, a deli 
sandwich has often been a vehicle of transmission (Table 2). 
The use of protective gloves is generally considered to prevent microbial contamination of food 
effectively by the food handler, as long as the gloves are intact and properly used (197). Indeed, data 
collected by Todd and co-workers (2007) found that, bare hand contact of the food handler with 
food was responsible for 105 out of 376 investigated foodborne HuNoV outbreaks, whereas gloved 
hand contact with the food had been responsible for only one of the outbreaks (80). Several 
laboratory studies show, however, that when they are contaminated, gloves can transfer HuNoVs to 
food quite easily (108, 133). Contamination of protective gloves while gloving repeatedly happened 
in study II. According to a volunteer study by Liu and co-workers (2009), the levels of HuNoVs on the 
hands of infected individuals could lead to the contamination of the gloves when gloving (20). The 
HuNoV surrogate, MS2, has also been observed to transfer from protective gloves to hands while 
removing the gloves (195). Proper hand hygiene, including proper hand washing, not just before 
gloving but also when changing the gloves should be strictly followed, but it is not always performed 
in real life (198). Education and regular remainding of hand hygiene would benefit the efforts to 
prevent HuNoV outbreaks originating from food handlers. 
Transfer of HuNoV between gloves, environmental surfaces, and food has been documented in 
laboratory conditions (106, 108, 126, 133, 135, 137, 139). It seems that only few previous reports on 
HuNoV transfer during simulated preparation of sandwiches have been published before study II. 
Our finding that HuNoV and its surrogate are transferred more easily from hands to food ingredients 
than from hands to stainless steel is supported by the observations of Bidawid and co-workers  in 
2004 (135) and Stals and co-workers in 2013 (108). It was observed in study II that gloves are an 
efficient donor surface compared to food or smooth and hard environmental surfaces. This result is 
in agreement to that found by Bidawid and co-workers, who observed that the transfer rates of FCV 
in the direction from bare fingers to food and environmental surfaces were much higher than 
opposite direction (135). 
The transfer of HuNoV and MuNoV in study II was detected by RT-QPCR, as has been reported in 
previous reports (106, 108, 126, 133, 137). Although RT-QPCR cannot discriminate between 
infectious and non-infectious particles transferred between the hands, gloves, and food products 
during sandwich preparation, the determination does give direct information on the risk of 
contamination by infective viruses in preparing RTE foods. Sandwiches are not usually heated or 
otherwise sanitized after their preparation. Therefore, if the contaminated sandwiches are 
consumed soon after their preparation, the infectious HuNoVs transferred from the gloves of the 
food handler to the food would still be infectious. 
It was estimated in study II that 4 log10 pcr-u or higher loads of HuNoV on contaminated hands would 
lead to contamination of approximately all the sandwich servings prepared after gloving on the same 
working shift despite covering of the hands with gloves. The quantitative exposure model of 
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Mokhtari and co-workers (199) and the recent HuNoV transfer model described by Verhaelen and co-
workers (128) support our findings that hands are a significant vehicle in HuNoV transmission during 
the processing of RTE foods. In our model, the transfer of only one infective virus particle was 
considered sufficient to cause contamination of gloves, utensils and food servings. However, in 
reality, the collecting of HuNoV particles, on aggregates containing from two to hundreds of 
infectious viruses, could impact upon the transfer rates of HuNoVs from surfaces to surfaces and 
result in higher or lower transfer rates in food preparation situations (200). 
Food handler involvement in the HuNoV outbreak in the resort, described in study III, was suspected, 
as HuNoV was detected on the freezer door handle and the kitchen tap handle, which indicated that 
contaminated hands had been touching them. As is often the case (16), no stool samples from the 
staff and no samples of the food that had been served was available for analysis. The general hygiene 
of the centre’s kitchen was visually good and none of the kitchen staff had been symptomatic at 
work about the time of the outbreak. After the outbreak it was impossible to tell if the food handlers 
had fallen ill after the initial case of HuNoV had already contaminated the resorts surfaces, or if one 
of the food handlers was the initial case, and had transmitted the disease to served food and to 
environmental surfaces. 
In order to exclude food handler involvement in the future, a regular sampling to detect HuNoVs in 
the kitchens preparing RTE foods should routinely occur. Swabbing could be combined with the 
regular sampling of environmental surfaces, that is designed to detect bacteria and food residues, 
and which is already in use to ensure food hygiene is maintained in many countries (201), including 
Finland (based on the General food hygiene regulation 852/2004/EU)(202). Similarly, regular 
sampling of surfaces in hospitals, in the military and other instances prone to HuNoV outbreaks 
would help the staff to prepare to the HuNoV outbreaks by, for instance, requesting diligent hand 
washing and by increasing the cleaning effords on surfaces. 
6.3 Inactivation of noroviruses on surfaces by UV irradiation (IV) 
The European Commission regulation on microbiological criteria for foodstuffs (EC No 2073/2005 
2005) declares that food should not contain micro-organisms, including HuNoV, in quantities that 
present an unacceptable risk for human health (203). The very low infective dose of HuNoVs, and 
their easy transfer from environmental surfaces to foodstuffs, raises the urgent need for effective 
inactivation methods for reducing the levels of these viruses upon food contact- and upon contact 
with other environmental surfaces. UV is considered to be an important alternative to chemical 
disinfection of micro-organisms and it has been used to inactivate bacteria in a hospital environment 
(204-206), including air, surfaces, and instruments (140). Although UV has been reported to 
inactivate HuNoV surrogates and probably HuNoV itself, efficiently both in suspension and on 
environmental surfaces (chapter 2.10.4), existing HuNoV outbreak management guidelines still 
require more research to be able to recommend their effective use for the disinfection of HuNoV on 
environmental surfaces (21, 207). Targeted studies on the effectiveness of UV towards HuNoVs 
would help in determining practical applications for the use of UV on surfaces and would propably 
lead to recommendations of its use by the authorities preparing the outbreak management 
quidelines. 
The efficacy of UV in reducing the levels of HuNoV on surfaces has been shown to be dependent on 
many different factors such as irradiation intensity, exposure time, lamp placement, and air 
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movement patterns (167). Since short-wavelength UV is easily blocked by solid objects, viruses may 
not be inactivated if sufficient faecal matter and other impurities are present on the surface at the 
time of disinfection, as also happened in our study. UV inactivation has been shown to follow so 
called ‘one-hit kinetics’, as reviewed by Cutler and Zimmerman. (167). This occurs when if a photon is 
absorbed during UV, one photoproduct is formed in the virus structure, which inactives the virus. 
Thus, raising the UV dose to viruses would result in a proportional increase in virus inactivation. 
Nuanualsuwan and co-workers observed this for FCV in 2002 when there was a straight correlation 
between the UV dose and FCV inactivation (171). Similar straight line curve of MuNoV inactivation 
was recorded in study IV, whereas the PCR reduction of the virus levels for both MuNoV and HuNoV 
occurred as a tailing reduction curve. A similar tailing off has also been observed for other viruses, 
such as polioviruses and rotaviruses (208). Experimental bias, two different subpopulations of viruses 
and an aggregation of these micro-organisms have been suggested as being a cause for the tailing, 
but no conclusive evidence has been presented (167). In our study, HuNoVs may have been 
protected from the UV on the surfaces by the blocking due to organic matter that originated in the 
diluted faecal sample. Therefore, initial cleaning of those surfaces has to be done before UV 
disinfection. 
Unlike many chemical agents, UV does not leave harmful residues on the disinfected sites (208), such 
as food contact surfaces. Instead it affects to air oxygen forming ozone, a gas with high oxidizing 
potential. Although the levels of ozone in rooms disinfected by UV are usually low, they may rise to 
concentrations that harm mucus and respiratory tissues in humans. The destructive nature of UV and 
it’s by product ozone not only towards microbes but also towards human cells severely limits their 
use in such a way that humans must never be exposed to them (140). Therefore disinfection of food 
contact surfaces in food industry, restaurants, hospitals and other facilities could be executed after a 
working shift has ended. 
6.4 The efforts to distinguish infective and inactivated noroviruses from each other 
by pre-PCR treatments (IV) 
RT-PCR and QRT-PCR methods only detect a specific sequence of the genomic material of HuNoVs, 
thus the infectivity of HuNoVs in samples found positive by these assays will remain unknown and 
the correlation between viral particles and genomic copies will not be clear. Several approaches have 
been developed to overcome the interpretation problems of these PCR assays, including the 
characterization of capsid changes that cause or accompany a loss of viral infectivity (209) and the 
detection determination of genome integrity (176, 210).  
Since the HuNoV virion is constructed simply of a shell formed by the capsid protein shielding the 
interior viral genome, a damaged capsid would be, in theory, more susceptible to protease 
degradation than capsids of undamaged viruses. Protease treatment would then result in an 
exposure of viral RNA, thus enabling the degradation of RNA by RNase and subsequently a negative 
RT-PCR result. In 2002, Nuanualsuwan and Cliver managed to reduce the PCR signal of inactivated 
FCV samples compared to the inactivated, non-treated virus samples by treatment with proteinase K 
and RNAse (211). Similar to that found by Nuanualsuwan and Cliver, it was also observed in study IV 
that enzymatic pre-PCR treatment distinctly accelerated the reduction of both MuNoV and HuNoV 
levels after UV treatment, although the reduction of pre-PCR treated MuNoV and HuNoV particles 
was not as great as the inactivation of MuNoV. Lamhoujeb and co-workers observed in 2008 that 
concentrations of proteinase and RNAse enzymes present in the FCV sample affected the capacity of 
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the enzymes to digest the sample (123). The enzyme concentrations and the balance between 
proteinase and RNAse enzymes also seemed to affect the digestion capacity of the enzymes in study 
IV. 
In 2010, Parshionikar and co-workers used propidium monoazide to penetrate the damaged or 
compromised virus capsids and bind covalently to viral RNA upon exposure to visible light (181). 
Those authors also observed that this bound RNA was unavailable for amplification, although the 
determination of the actual number of infectious HuNoVs was not successful in all cases. Sano and 
co-workers (2010) introduced a method in which the viruses that were under oxidative stress could 
be separated from intact virions by avidin-immobilized affinity chromatography (183). The method 
only measured the oxidative products on the viral capsid protein, consequently it may have 
overestimated the infectivity of HuNoV after treatments that mainly target the viral RNA (211). The 
enzymatic treatment that was used in study IV may have similarly failed to digest the viral particles 
which only had damaged RNA, but not the protein capsid, which would have given an overestimation 
of the persistence of MuNoV and HuNoV towards UV. 
Another approach to discriminating between infectious and non-infectious HuNoVs is based on the 
binding properties of infective viruses to porcine gastric mucins, which results in the unbound virus 
particles being discarded and thus not copied in the PCR assays (172). In these experiments, a small 
amount of HuNoVs were still bound to gastric mucins after the sample had been treated by a 500 
mJ/cm2 dose of UV. After the same UV dose, enzymatically treated MuNoV and HuNoV samples still 
produced positive signals after RT-QPCR runs also in our study. Li and co-workers (2011) used Caco-2 
cells as also used by Dancho and co-workers to bind to infective HuNoVs (180). As a result, those 
authors observed that the method could decrease the lower limit of thr detection levels in a 10-fold 
dilution series of HuNoVs by 1–3-log10, but the detection of non-infectious viral particles could not be 
eliminated totally, as was also found in our study. 
Food and environmental samples are usually tested for HuNoVs by using RT-PCR or RT-QPCR (102). 
Samples that give a positive RT–PCR test result, although the viruses in the samples are actually 
inactivated, are likely to be wrongly perceived as threats to public health. Furthermore, detected 
HuNoV genome in food products, such as in frozen berries, can result wide withdrawal of the 
products and thus large costs to the society. Therefore, pre-PCR treatments that could help in 
distinguishing between infective and inactivated HuNoVs would theoretically facilitate the public 
health authorities’ decision making when HuNoVs have been detected in food or environmental 
samples. In practice, HuNoV contamination from food is difficult to detect with the present methods 
and the need for treatments distinguishing infective and inactivated HuNoVs is under debate. The 
small infective dose of HuNoV leads to the requirement that even a very small infectious proportion 
of these viruses must be identified in order to be able to declare the sample free on these pathogens. 
At present, pre-PCR treatments may still be not sensitive enough to be routinely used in the field.   
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
1 The swabbing method used in this study is suitable for the detection of HuNoV on 
environmental surfaces and hard food surfaces. It is easy to perform, is time-
saving and the RNA of the virus remains detectable in the swabs for days after the 
sampling. Currently available methods for identifying HuNoV in food products are 
often laborious and time-consuming, and food as well as faecal samples may not 
be available for analysing. Thus, sampling of food contact surfaces and 
environmental surfaces offers a rapid alternative for detecting the presence of 
HuNoV during outbreak investigations, surveillance and risk assessment. 
 
2 HuNoV is easily transferred from gloves of a food handler to RTE foods during 
manual preparation of food items, such as cucumber sandwiches. The transfer 
rates of the virus and the number of food servings onto which the virus is likely to 
transfer to are dependent on the initial HuNoV load on the hands of food 
handlers. The wearing of protective gloves while preparing RTE foods did not 
prevent HuNoV contamination of the foods, when the food handler had virus-
contaminated hands before gloving. HuNoV-contaminated gloves were found to 
transfer the virus to the food servings more efficiently than a single contaminated 
food ingredient during the preparation of a deli sandwich. 
 
3 When HuNoVs are circulating in the population, usually during early spring, their 
genome can be detected on environmental surfaces in places where humans have 
been in close proximity to one another. HuNoV is mostly detected on surfaces 
most often touched by bare hands, such as door handles. During an outbreak, the 
HuNoV load on environmental surfaces can be high enough to enable sequencing 
of the outbreak virus genome from environmental swabs taken from the outbreak 
site. 
 
 
4 Results for the HuNoV surrogate MuNoV imply that HuNoV is inactivated quite 
effectively on environmental surfaces, by UV. The results of UV inactivation as 
determined by a viability assay are not comparable to the results of viral genome 
persistence after UV treatment. Viral RNA can even be detected on environmental 
surfaces treated with very high UV doses, while infectivity is lost with much lower 
doses. Faecal matter or other impurities facilitate the persistence of HuNoV. 
 
5 Pre-PCR treatments such as enzymatic digestion by pronase and RNAse enzymes 
can reduce positive signals due to damaged virus particles upon RT-QPCR. 
However, attaining a level at which all inactivated virus particles would be 
enzymatically digested is not feasible using the present methods. 
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